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Summary findings
Voucher funds have arisen in the transitional  economies  management  boards. There is concern about conflicts  of
of Eastern and Central Europe that have used voucher  interest in bank-sponsored  funds and excessive  control of
privatization. These funds collect vouchers from citizens  enterprises. Funds typically  lack capital or expertise  to
and use them to buy shares in enterprises.  undertake restructuring  - but few other potential
In the Czech and Slovak  Republics,  voucher funds arc  owners are likely  to be better qualified.
typically  organized as corporations owned by the citizens  Anderson examines  27 regulations  that have been
who contributed their vouchersm  Recently,  they have also  proposed for funds. Regulations  in transitional
been organized as unit trusts (cither open-ended or  economies,  unlike regulations in most westem countries,
closed).  A management  company manages  the funds  should encourage  funds to play a strong role in corporate
under a contract that specifies  the managemcnt fee. The  governance, he contends, as few potential owners have
management  company is typically  owned by the initial  this ability.
sponsor of the fund - for example, a bank.  Most importan,  regulations  should require that funds
Voucher funds can give owners  a diversified  and  disclose information about their operations so their
professionally managed  portfolio. More important, the  owners can monitor and control fund managers.
funds select who sirs on an enterprise's governance  The regulatory regime, he says, should discourage
boards (which  oversee management and profitability).  monopolies and anticompetitive  behavior; create
Although experience is limited, the funds in these two  incentives  for fund managers  to improve fund
countries have probably stopped most fraud and self-  performance; discouragc  self-serving  or fraudulent
serving by enterprise managers and are beginning  to  behavior  by fund managers, and conflicts of interest; and
encourage the restructuring needed for profitability. A  eliminate high-risk  investments  unacceptable to fund
few funds have replaced poorly performing or dishonest  owners.
managers; more often, because  qualified replacements  Because  there is so litde experience  with these funds,
are few, they encourage managers to improve  the regulatory regime should not be unduly restrictive.
performance.  As problems arise, regulations  to deal with them can be
There have been complaints about funds' performance.  added.
Some have made unrealistic  promises to voucher holders
and have appointed poorly qualified members to
This paper is a product of the Europe and Central Asia and Middle East  and North Africa Regions  Technical  Department,
Private Sector and FinanceTeam. Copies of thie paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington DC 20433. Please  contact Faten Hatab, room HS-087, extension 35835 (47 pages).  July 1994.
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'~  --  Term  Definition  _
Cash Fund  A mutual  fund in which the members  contibute cash.  The
fimd uses this cash fund to buy enterprse shares.
Voucher  Fund  A muual fund in which the members  contribute  vouchers. The
fumd  uses these vouchers  to buy enterprise shares  in voucher
auctions.
Enterpie  Share  Shares  issued by former Statowned  enterprises  now held by
various owners  including  voucher funds.
Entpse  Sharehoid-  The holders of entepise  shares and thus the owners  of
ers  entpses.  Major shareholders  may be the voucher funds.
Fund Shares  Shares  issued by the voucher funds to their own shareholdes.
Fund Shareholders  The holders of fimd  aes  and thus the owners  of the funds.
Board of Superviors  The senior governance  board in those companis wit  a two tier
board.
Management  Board  The junior govemance  board sometimes  called  the Board of
Directors in Germany  or E:xecutive  Board in the Czech  and
Slovak  Republics
invastnent Company  A type of voucher  fund established  as a corporation. The
mers  are shareholders  of the fimd.
Unit Trust  A type of voucher  fimd established  as a contractual  trusL  The
members  are holders of partcipation units.
Open  End Fund  A type of cash or voucher fund that Permits  its members  to
redeem their shares/units  from the fimd  for its net asset value.
Closed End Fund  A type of cash or voucher fund that Permits  its membes to sell
their shares or partaion  units to other investors  but not to
redeen  their  shares/units from  the fund for  cash.
Management Company  A company that is hired to manage a find.  Somcimes  referred
to as investment companies.
Sponsor  An individual or a company  such as a bank tat  establishes the
fund and initially hires the management company for the fund.
Privately-Sponsored  A voucher  fund whose sponsor  is a pnvate individual or  com-
Fund  pany.
Government-Sponsored A voucher fund whose sponsor  is the government
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1.  Description  of Funds
1.1  This paper analyzes  the role of the new  voucher  funds th  have arise  in those Central
and Eastern  European  countres dtat have  implemented  voucher  privatization. These  funds have
been given different names in different  countries,  but their functions  are similar. Such funds
are similar to Western mutual funds except their members buy shares in the fund using
vouchers, and the fimds  then use the vouchers  to buy sha  in enterprises. The term "voucher
fiad'  is used rather than mutual fund or investment  fund to make  it clear that the partcipants
contibute vouchers  rather than cash to these funds.
1.2  The fllowing  primarily analyzes the experience  of the Czech and Slovak Republics
though  some compansons  are made  with other transiton countries  in the region. The two key
issues are:
dthe  success  of voucher  fnds  in monitoring  and supevsing the enterpises in which the
finds have purchased  shares in order to improve  performance  and profitabiity of these
nterprises, in other words, the role of voucher  funds in -corporate  govenance"; and
*  deign  of a regulatory  famework that encourages  funds to play a positive  rle  in the
development  of the economy  and limits any undesirable  or harmfiu  activities  of funds.
1.3  The analysis  is based on discussions  with government  officials in these two republics,
intiews  with three funds in the Slovak  Republic  and six finds in the Czech  Republic,  and
inteviews  with six enterprises in the Czech Republic  and four enteprises in the Slovak
Republic  that are now primarily owned  by the voucher fumds3.  The analysis also draws on
,The findings,  interpretons, and  conlusions  expressed  in this paper are endrely  the aushors  and
should not be attribed  to the World Bank, im Board of Directors, its management,  or any of its
member  counties.
2The  author  was  accoed  in some  of  the interviews  in the  Czech  Republic  by Mitchell  Orenstein  and
Karla  Brom  of fte European  Studies  Center  of the  Institute  for  EastWest  Sudies  in Prague.  They  have
used  the results  of these  interviews  as well  as others  to prepare  a report  on the new  private  sector  in the
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several  papers  prsted  at a conference  on voucher  finds sponsored  by the Certral and Easern
Euren  Pivatton  Network (CEEPN)  held in Prague on Octber  29-30, 1993.
Types of Funds
1.4  Voucher  funds in transition  economies  can be divided  into two tpes  according  to their
sponsors.  In some counties, fimds were founded almost  exclusively  by private individuals,
companies,  or institutions. These coun  :s  include the Czech Republic,  Slovakia,  Russia, and
Lithuania. In other countres, however,  the government  plans  to create  the funds or has already
done so though the inenton  is to eventually  transfer these  funds to private owneship.  These
countries  include Rumania  and Poland. This report will primadly analyze  the experience  with
pivately-sponsored funds, though some conclusions  are also applicable  to government-spon-
sored hmd.
1.5  Privatey-sponsored voucher funds have arisen in those countries that are  seling
Stae-owned enterises  for vouchers  (coupons)  rat  han cash.  Such vouchers  are prvided
free or for a nominal  charge  to all citizens. Two distnct types  of voucher  auctions  have been
used:
(i)  a centralized  auctian (the Czech and Slovak Republics)  in which the shares of many
enterprs  are sold simultaneously  in a single  auction; and
(H)  enterprise  by entepise  auctions  (Russia,  Lithuania,  and Mongolia)  in which  each  enter-
prise is sold over time independenty  of the others.
Vario  theoretical  and practcal arguments  can be made  in favor of each type of auction. The
type of auctin  used, however,  does not significanty change  the role of the funds.
1.6  Privately-sponsored  funds have been founded by both domestic and foreign entities
including  banks, insurance  companies,  entripnses, and individual  businessmen. Citizens  then
tumed over their vouchers  to the new finds in exchange  for shares in the funds themselves.
The funds  used the  accumulatd vouchers  to bid for shares  in the auctions  of enterpses.  In the
end, the funds acquied a portfolio of shares in former State-owned  enterprses on behalf of
their own s  ldes.
1.7  Because  the funds themselves  are usually  corporatims that issue sha  to their owners,
there is often  confusion  when  the tms  "share,  -shareholder,"  or "owner"  is used. Do these
tms  refer to the former Stat-owned entepnses  that are now private companies  or to the
voucher  funds that are themselves  private companies? HEreaftr, the terms "enterprse shar"
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Czech  Republic  and  their  analysis  supplements  and  in certain  cases  expands  on the issues  dealt  with  in
this  paper. See Brom  and Orenstn (1993).Voucher  Funds  in the Transtion  Economies  3
and 'enterpse saebolder  (owne)" rer  to shar  issued  by the forner State-owned  enterpris-
es because  of priva  aon  nd now held by a variety of owners including  voucher  fimds. The
terms  'fund share  and 'fund saeholder  (owner)' refer to the  shares  issued by the funds and
now held by the owners of the  funds, namely, the former voucher  holders who gave.their
vouchers  to the fimds. Fund shares  may  be traded  on the stock  mariet along with the  enterprise
shares though the value  of fund shares obviously depends on the underlying  value of the
enrpise  shares owned  by the  funds.
Structure of Funds
1.8  As noted above, funds are typically  cor  ions and ths  are subject  to general legal
provisions  concerning the organitio  and structure of such companies.  Some countres,
however, have instituted a special legal framework  for funds that  include rirements  not
applied  to other corporations.  As discussed  below, funds may also be established as unit trusts,
but most of the analysis in this report assumes that funds are established as corporations.  The
structu  and organization of funds will depend on the particula  legal e  in  each
country.
1.9  The structre  and  tion  Fig. 1
Of the funds  in many  transition coun-
ties are sinilar  to that in the  Czech  FUND STRUCTURE
and Sloak  Republics.  Using  these
two countries  as examples,  it is neces-  En  p
ary todistinguish  between  three legal  Sponsor
entities  assocated  with a fund (see
FLg.  1). These  are: (i) the fimd  itself,
(ii) the snsor  of the  fund, and (iii)
the management company for  the
fund.  These three enftties  are some-  _n  t  oo
times not clearly distinguishied  and  con  trc  Ftd
often collectively  called  the 'fund.'  contra
1.10  As a corporation, the fund is  /I 1  \
owned by  its  s  o  namely,
citizs  who tansferred their vouch-
ers to the fimd.  At the  annual  meet-  Fund  Owne
ing,  these shareholders  elect  the
governance  boards  (for  example,
Board of Supervisors  or Managment Board) that are responsible  for the managment of te
fund between  the  annual  meetings. As discussed  in more detail below, the  number, functions,
and  structure  of these  boards  depend  on the  specific  corporate  law  in each  country. Like other
corporations,  the  funds  in the  Czech  and  Slovak  Republics  have  both  a Supevisory  Board  and
a Magement  Board.It-  :  -:
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1.11  The  sponsor  of  the  fund  may  be any  legal  entity  or  individual  that  organized  and
established  a management  company  that in tum organized  and established  the fund.  The
management  company  is usually  a corporation  itself  The sponsor  typically  will  continue  to be
the owner  of the management  company,  but neither  the sponsor  nor the management  company
is the pemanent owner  of the fund.
L 12  The management  company  established  by the sponsor,  however,  is likely  to be the  initial
but temporary  owner of the fund until the fund shares  ae  distributed  to the voucher  holders.
The m  ment  company  also provides the initial operating  expenses  for the fund until the
fund obtains  its own sources  of ime,  for example,  dividends  from shares  in its portfolio  or
from selling  shares. The funds  in the Czech  and Slovak  Republics  have  been  pleased  to see  the
lare  incease in share  prices  on the Prague stock  exchange  over the last few months  because
the  can more easily sel  some shares to cover ther operatng expenses. The sponsor  also
expects  that the man  cet  company  will continue  to advise  the fund on the management  of
its potfolio and carry out most  of the other  activities  of the fund under  a management  contract
The fund typically  pays a  management  fee to the management  company  statd  as  some
percentage  of the value  of the fund's assets. As discussed  below,  counties with  voucher  fimds
often  regulate  the size  and structre of this fee. This use of management  compamies  is copied
from the stucture  of  muual  funds in the United States and Western Europe.  In theory,
however, there is noreasoc why a  fund likeany other corporation could not benmanaged  by its
own staff rather than a management  company.
1.13  After the voucher holders  become the owners  of the fimd, they have complete  legl
authority  to select  another  management  company  and sever  any connecton  with  the sponsor  of
the fund.  Until the annual  meetngs of fund shareholders  have occurred,  however,  it is not
clear whether shareholders  will exercise  this right.  An important  test of the ability of the
thousands  of fiund  shareholders  to control  the funds  will be whether  they can change  manage-
ment companies  and thus  place  pressure  on the sponsors  and their management  companies  to
better  manage  the funds. Alternatively,  funds  may  become  similar  to many  large companies  in
the United States with widely dispesed ownership,  and as a  result incumbent  managers
effectively  control  the companies.
1.14  The income of  the fund wiR  cornefrom  dividends  paid by companies  in which the fund
owns shares and from selling shares from its portfoho.  The fund can then use  his  income  for
three purposes: (i) paying dmidends  to its own shareholders,  (iH)  paying the expeses of the
fund, for example, the fee paid to the management  company,  or (iii) puchaing  additional
shares of companes.  This income  cotuld  become a new source of capital for enterprses if the
fnd  decides  to invest  in newly issued shares  of enteprses  rather hn  pay diidends to the
fimd's shareholds.  This does not appear to have happened  yet to any great extent in the
Czech  and Slovak  Republics,  at least in part, because  funds  have  received  only a small  amount
of dividend  payments  from companies  in their  portfolios.Voucher  Funds  in the  Transition  Economies  5
1.15  An important  isue is the  taxation  of the  income  of the  funds  that  is related  to the
tLaxaio  Of  coprtosin  thee  coutrbies  in genewal.  If allcroaia  including  funds  ave
required  to paymacorporate  income  tax,  this  could  lead  to "double  tandont of the  income  of
entrprses  Duble txation would  aris in the  following  situation.  Fhirst  supp osetha
enteqirse  must  pay  a corporate  income  tax  on  thidr  earnings  and  then  pay  dividends  to their
tadeord  from  after-tax  income.  Next,  suppose  that  the  dividends  pai  by  the  enterprse
to the  fands is also  considered  income.  for tax  purposes  on which  the  funds  must  pay  the
coroatem  incme tax  Thus,  this  tax  is paid  a secon  time  on the  sane  income.  Thnis  could
greaty  discourage  part  ficiptio  in voucher  funds  because  doing  so  would  double  the  taxes  that
voucher  hodWers  would  have  to  py  on  their  futur income  from  owning  shares.
1.16  There  are  avariety  of waysof  avoiding  this  double  taxtion. One  exmplecopiedfrom
the  U.S. would  be to allow voucher  funds  to deduct  from  their taxable  income  all divideds
-i to thir  own shar  s  hus if the  voucher  funds -i dividends  equal  to the  dividends
they  receive  from  enterprises  as  well  as  income  from  selling  share  (called  "capital  gains*),,  they
would  not  have  to  pay  corporate  income  taxes?  Tik-s,  however,  would  discourage  fluids  from
reinvesting  their  income  back  into  the  enterprise  and  instead  would  encourage  them  to  pay  all
of thir  income  as divdends  to their own
2.  Functions  of Voucher  Funds
2.1  Voucher fnds  can ha  three major functi  that can contribute  to the success  of
vouce piaizto  and  eownomic  reform  in general.  Voucher  holders  decding  whethe  to
entrut their  vouchers  to a particular  fund  must  make  some  judgement  as  to the  ability of tha
fund  to carry  out these functions.  The  following  disuses  ach  of these  functions.
Portfolo Diversification
2.2  The  first funcion is portfolio dieificatio.  By tnsferring  fteir  vouchers  to a fumd,
voucher  hldes  can  obtain  a p  io  ownership  of a lge  dversfid  potolio  of shar
in many enterpr.  Since  the value  of a voucher  is typicaly small,  an ididual  voucher
hokler  can  buy  only a few shame  in one  or two companies.  For example,  in the  f  t  wave  of
5Ano&er  more  technical  problem  for voucher  fumds  is  how  to calculate  the  inome  received  by  a hand
wham,  it sells  shares,  commony  referred  to as  capital -an  income.  Capitd  aln-  is  usualy  mseasred
- the  diffe  betweolen  price  at which  the fund sold  oae  from its  portfolio  and  the  price  itai
r  The  sharesoriginay.  if tpri  hasgoneup,  the fundois  said  to  a  cap  lgan  fthe price
hs gone  down,  the  fol  is said  to have  a  fcapita  loss!' The  problem  is  that  the  fouas  did at pay  a
caih - for shares  in thir  initial  portfolios.  They  boughmh  shares  using  vouchers.  Thu  it 
uncle what  the  initial  purchase  price  fDr  these  shares  should  be  for  purposes  of cculating  capia  gains
and  los.  For  exmple,  should  a pice of zero  be used or the nmnal Cpar  vaW) of th  sha
which  was  se at 1,000  cns  for al swa  sold  in the  voucher  aucton.6  Ri.  Anderson
the Czech  and Slovak  voucher aucions, a typical enterprise  share was initially  priced at 33
points per share.  Thus, a single  voucher  worth 1,000 points  could be used to purchase  only
about 30 shuas at tis  p-ice.  Owning  part of a diversified  portfolio reduces risk for the
voucher  holder snce the futue value  of Shares  in any one company  is likely to flurtuate  much
more  an a diverified portfolio  composeci  of shares  in many companes.  The ultimate  in a
diversified  portfolio  is a so called  "inde,xed"  fund that owns  a fmcon  of the shares  of a large
number  of enterprises. 4 No fund  in the Czech  or Slovak  Republics  appars to have  advertised
itsdf as an index  fund, but regulatons  in those  countnes  requir that all finds invest  in at least
10  enterpses.  Larger  funds invested  in many more  than the minimum,  sometimes  as many  as
100 or 200 enteprises.
Portfolio Selection
2.3  The second  function  is portfolio  selection. The sponsor  of a fund and the management
company  hired to manage  the fund may be better able to choose  enterpise shar  in which  to
invest compared to an individual  voucher holder.  Lt ote  words, voucher holders may taser
thei vouchers  to a fund beause they bdieve that the fund can 'pick winners' from the large
number  of enteprises being offered  in the voucher  auctions. In voucher  auctions,  being  able
to pick winners  does not mean  simply choosing  those enterprises  that are likely to be more
proftable than  others. It means  picking  enterprises  whose  prices  quoted  in the auction  are low
compared  to their estimated futre  earnings.  Like;  any investor in the stock market, the
management  company  of a fund will  try to select  'undervalued' companie and avoid 'overval-
ued' compaiesm.
2.4  In Western  stock  markets,  a body of financial  theory  says that it is not possible  to pick
undervalued  cmpanes  because  the markets  in these counties are 'efficiet" 5 An efficient
maret  is one in which pries  of Sha  instantly adjust to reflect all of ffie  available informatin
about  each  particular  enterprise. Thus in such  a market  it is not  possible  to find an undervalued
company  or an overvalued  company,  and the market  price of each  company's  shares  accurately
reflects everythng hat.  is curently known  about its future  earings potentiaL  An 'efficient'
market does  not mean, however,  that curret  estimates  of futr  earnings  are always  correct
Because of events that no one could anticipate, future eamings  may be higher or lower than
now predicted,  and the futre  pnce of shares may  nse or fall from cunent levels. There  is no
reason  to believe,  however,  that the  probability  is higher  that the  price will rise or that the  -
Will falL
'Such  a fund is called  an 'indexedj'  d because  the value  of its portfolio  is designed  to track closely
one of te popular  inderces  of overal stock  mariet value. To do this, the fimd  includes  in its portfolio
shares  of each enterie  that is covered  by the selected  stock  maket index.
5For  a nn-tehical  description  of the  theory  of an "efficient stock  market,  m  Maldel (1990)  pp. 130-
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2.5  Bocaus  of  th  lack of  generally avwilable  financial nd  othe  infomaon  about
enterpises  sold in voucher aucdons, one can reasonably doubt whether the vouher  aucion
market in  the Czech and  Slovak Republcs  or in other  ansto  economies  would be an
"efficient"  market  in which  the voucher  funds  could not find undervalued  companies.  In any
event, it is liky  that  voucher  holders felt that  funds  could pick undervalued  companies  thus
contributing  to the  popularity  of these  fiuds.  In the Czech and Slovak  Republics,  the  most
popular  funds  were those  managed  by banks. On thc one hand,  this  may have  bee  due simply
to the fact  that these  ban  were  widey k:nown  and had  the resources  to advrtie.  On the  other
hand, individuals  may have  believed  that  banks  had iside or better  information  about  fth future
eangs  potential  of enwrprs.  Thes  banks  were the  major lenders  to entepises  and thus
peraps  in a better  poston  to pick undervalued  companies  and avoid  overvaued  companies  in
the  voucher  aucdons.
2.6  There i inadequate information  now to judge whether the funds in the Czech  and
Slovak  Republics  could  pick undervalued  compan.  Funds did typically  buy sha  in those
entises  that had a high  price compared  to their  book  value.'  In odher  words, the funds  wer
more  likely to buy shares m those  companies  tat  had an above average  earnings  potentaL
This does  not mean  tat  such  enterpris shares  were undervalued,  however. In fact,  the pces
paid  for the shares in  ihese  enteises  could  have been too high compared  to their futur
earigs  potential,  and the  fiids  might  have  been  better  off choosing  lowe pced shares.  The
ultimate  test  will be whether  the pices  of the sbais  bought by the funds rie  fister in the
secondary  market  than  other  sbares. As other  vestos  realize  that the  funds  wer able to  pick
undervaued  shares,  the prices  of shares  held by funds should ise bster than  other shares.
2.7  The efforts  of the funds  in evaluating  companies  did help to bring  about  a more  efficient
market,  and individual  voucher  holders  receved  in some  sense  a free ride on  the  efforf of teh
funds. If the  flmds  did discover  undervalued  companies,  these funds would  rush to buy such
sha  and thus  bid up their pnces.  Similarly,  the fiuds would avoid buying shares in
overvalued  companies  thus  forcing  down their  prices. The irony  is that  the effort of the fnds
to find undervalued  shares  led to a more  efficient  market  in which fewer  shares  we  underval-
ued or overvalued.
2.8  As the  voucher  auctions  became  more wefflcientC  due to the  effrts  of the funds,  voucher
holders  who did  not entrust ffieir  vouchers  to a fund  could  do remasonably  wdl by pickdng  shares
simply  at andor.  In other words,  individual  investos could not make  a sero  mistake  in
buying  shares  no matter  which  shares  they  purchased  because  no shares  were overvalued. All
share  prices rwghly reflected  the future earnings  potential  of the companies  than  at least
parially to the  efforts of the fimds.  Individual  vwolher  holders may not have bee  able to
invest in a diverified portfolio  witiout transferring  their vouchers  to a fund, but they are
unlikely  to have  paid an excessively  hi  price for tie shares  they  did  purchase Thus  it can  be
0 Shafil  (1993),  p. 34.8  R. Anderson
arguwed  that all investo  in the  auctions  wer trated with rough  justice at least in part due  to the
effort of the funds to cvaluate Companies. 7
2.9  lust as imporant as buying shares for the fund's portfolio  is the selling  of shams from
the portfolio.  The selling  of shares  by a fund allows  the ownership  of an enterpis  to pass to
another  investor, for example,  a forign company  opatng  in the same industry, who may be
better  able to s  vse and control  the enteprise and thus  ince  its efficiency  and profitabili-
ty.  This is sometimes  called the market for corpoate control.
2.10  Those who oppose  voucher  pivaization ague that the government  instead  ought  to sell
an enterprise to larg  fo  or domestic  investors  who can bring both additional  capil  and
expertise  to the management  of the enterprise.  They argue that voucher funds have neither
uthe  purpose  of this paper  is not  to evalua alternative  types  of voucher  programs,  the type  of
voucher  auction  used does  unpact on whether  the resulting market for  shares  is  "efficientw  and whether
participants are  aed  fairly.  The tpe  of voucher auction used in the Czech and Slovak Republics had
one fature  that made it less likely to be "efficient  and thus arguably detracted fmm the firness  of the
program.  hi  feature ws  that the aucton  method forced some voucher holders to invest in shares dtht
wer  overpriced and thus receved  less value for their vouchers relative to other voucher holders.  The
general approach used in these auctions was to have multiple roads  of bidding with prices adjusting
fom  rund  to  round to  bring about a balance between supply and demand for  the shares of each
antprise.  For exmple,  if the in  price for the share of an enterprise resulted in excess dmand,  the
prce  was raised in subsequent rounds.  Ihe  exception  to this general approach was that shares in some
companies were sold at the current pnce  even though they were under-subscribed.  In these cases, the
general view of the market was that the curet  quoted price for these enteprises  was too bigh and thus
demand was less than supply.  Those voucher holders, however, who did make an of.r  at that price
were forced to buy the shares at that price.  The unsold shares were offered again t!  later rounds at a
lower price to attract more buyers.  In these cases, the market was clearly not  efficienf  since the  e
actually  paid by some participants did not reflect all of the information about the enterprise avaHable  to
the other participants.  Those who were forced to buy under-subscnibed  and thus overvalued shares were
in some sense not treated fairly.
The auction system used in Russia and some other counties is even less likely to approximate  an
effcient market and  the inequities  are even  greater. This is becmse the  Russian  system  sells  enterpnses
one by one independently of each other rather than simulteously  as in the Czech and Slovak aucto.
A bidder in  a Russian auction has no way of knowing what the prices will be for  shares in other
enterpse  or  even what enteprs  will eventally  be  offered for  sale.  In the  Czech and Slovak
auctions,  a bidder codd  evahate  whether an enterprise was undervalued or overvalued compared to
other enterprises and thus  choose an enterprise that seemed to offer the best ratio of price to  fiture
earin  potential.  This is simply not possible in the Russian type of auction.  Thus such an auction can
not even remotely resemble an 'efficient" market, and the value of the shares purchased is likely tD vary
much more from inividual  to indda  n in the Czech and Slovak auctions.  Russian government
officas  recognized these theoretical weakness  but  chose that type of  auction becmse  of vaious
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capital  nor expertise  to carry  out  neededretuuin  of th  enterprise. Those  who  support
voucher  prvtzto,  however,  argue that the  funds will be willing  to sell  their shares  to a
lare  investor if the investor  could  do a better  job of  managing  the enterprise.  Voucher
priatzatondoes  not preclude  the later sale  by the funds  to a large  investor  if such  an investor
is interested.  The  reason  the  vorhJer  funds  would  be  willing  to sell  is that  the  investr  should
be  willng to pay  an  attractive  price  for the  shares  of the  company.  Because  the  investor  has  a
better  plan  to improve  efficiency  and  profitability,  this  investor  can  afford  to py  a higher  price
than  now  quoted  on the  stock  market. Such  sales  should  be  encouraged  because  the  overall
efficiency  of the  economy  would  be  improved.
Corporate  Governance
2.11  The  thin andperhaps  most  important  function  of the  funds  isto governthose  enptepise
in which  they  own  shares.  Though  the  firs two  functions  of funds  (portfolio  diversification  and
selection)  are iliportant,  they  primarily  involve  issues  of equity  or fairess,  in other  words,  how
individuals  are  treated  in the,  voucher  auction  system.  Whether  an  individual  can  obtain  a
diversfifed  portfolio  or  whether  thevralue  of  his  or her  portfolio  is high  or  low does  not  greaty
affect  the  general  functioning  of the  economy  in general  or enterprse  in particular.
2.12  When  voucher  privatization  was  first proposed,  the  most  seriou criticism  was  that  it
would  not result  in "good"  owners  who  would  take.  an  active  interes  in the  future  ef  ficienc and
profitability  of enterprises.  In particular,  it was  feared  that  shares of enterprise  would  be
dispersed  among  millions  of voucher  holders  who  could  not  influence  or control  the  enterprise
that  they  owned. Though  not anticipated  in the initiakl  planning  for the Czech  and  Slovak
voucher  program,  the  spontaneous  creaio of funds  by  privat individuals  and  insdtittions  has
at least  partially  elimninated  this  weaknes  of voucher  privatization.
2.13  Doubts  about  fthe  effect  ivenes of pxriately-sponsored  funds  in governing  enterprse,
however,  have  led  some  countries,  most  notably  Poland,  to creat  government-sponsored  funds.
In these  case,  the  government  would  choose  the  maaeetcompany  for  each  fund,  establish
the  terms  of the  maaeetcontract,  and  select the  portfolio  of enterpise that  each  fund
would  own. The  goal  is that  the  ownership  of suck  funds  would  be  Iransferre  eventually  to  the
citizes of the  country  and  thus  be  privatized.
3.  Models  of  Corporate  Govemance
3.1  The debate  over the role of funds and whether  privately-sponsored  or govern-
ment-sponsored  funds  are  best  in trasition  economies  stems  in part  from  differences  in views
about  the  role of owners  of large  compxanies.  To illustrate  thee differences,,  the  following
presents  three  different  models  for corporate,  governance  that are applicable  to trAnsition
economnies.  Table  1 lists  the  thre models  and  the  likely percentage  of shares  owned  by fth
largest  investor  in each  model.10  R. Anderson
Table 1
Dispersed  Ownership
Models of Corporate Govenance
3.2  In the first model, ownership of l
public corporations  is widely dispersed  wit  I  Ownership  by
no  angle owner  or  even a coalition of own-  Largest Investor
ers having  a  stong  voice  in  the goverance
of  the  entprise.  The  largest  mivdua  Died  less  tIan  10%
shareholder  has  less  than  10 percent  vi  the  dojn  10 to 50%
shar  and does not  have a r  tative  on
the govemance  boards  of the entrpises.  Holg  Company  51 to 100%
3.3  Most lrge  companies in  the United
Stat  are example of dispased ownership. In the U.S., small  individual  investos  own about
half the  hares. Though  the  other half the  shares  are owned by financ  instituons  such as
mutual  funds,  peon  funds,  and  insurance  companes, each  institution  only  owns  a  smal
ftion  of the shares  in  a partculr  company.  For  example,  the five largest  sharholde  in
l-are  U.S.  companie  typically own in total less tha  five percent  of all shares.' Thus,  even the
lagest  shareholdes usually play  a passive  role in  corporate  govenance.
3.4  Government  gulation and  tax laws limit the ability of financial  institutio  to play an
active role.  For  example  in  the United States,  the GlassSteagall  Act  of  1933  and the  Bank
Holding  Company  Act of  1956 restrict bans  firom owing  share  in entprises  or  sposoring
mutnul funds.  C  ueny,  the govenance  board  that  offcially  represents the  intrest  of
shareholdes in U.S.  companies  (the Board of Directors)  is often under  the control  of manage-
met  and may only intervene  m  manemnat  of the  ny  n  aordi  circumstanc-
es.  As  opposed to  direct  pressure  from  the owners,  indirect  pressure  on mangement  o
impre  prnce  comes from market competiton, the quoted stock maret  pice,  the threat
of take overs,  oveght  by lenders  such as banks,  debt ratings by such institutions  as Moodys
and  Stndard  and Poors,  and thret  of bankruptcy.
3.5  It is q  ble  whe  these indire  pressures  on management  work well even in the
United  States.  Complaints  are  often made that  managers  i  the United  States pay  themselves
excessive saries though  their company  is peforming badly, oppose a new own  buying a
controlling  block of sh  in teir  company because they ar  cncered  about losing  theirjobs
(so call  whostile taewers  because  existing  management  is hostile  to the new owner),  and
squander  the fnancial  resources  of the conmpany  on new investments  and expansio  plans  that
increase  the  prestige  and  salaries  of  the  manags  but  prvide  a  low  rate of  return to  the
shareholder.  In  any  event,  these  indirect  pressures  are  even  weaker i  many  transition
economies,  and  thus  the model  of  disprsed  ownerhip  is probably  not  well  suied  to  these
counuies.
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Institutional  Ownership
3.6  In thie  second  model,  financial  institutions  such  as banks, pension  funds, or mutual  funds
are the dominant  shareholders. Several of these institutions  would each typically  own some-
where betwee  10 and 50 percent of  the shares.  Thbus  they have an incentive to closely
supervise and monitor  the performance  of maaeetand  to demand  representation  on the
goverance  boards for that purpose.
3.7  This model is  exemplified  by Germany what  the banks play a  dominant role in
corporate govenace.  Gedran  banks often control a large proportion  of the shares of the
largest  enterprises.'  The shares controlled  by these banks  consist of shares owned  directly  by
the banks,  sa  held by the banks for individual  ins  vstors  who purchased  the shamr  thoaugh
the banks since banks are also the largest brokes  in Germany, and shares i  affiiated  mutual
funds.  in the Czech  and Slovak  Republics,  large banks are the sponsors  of the largest  voucher
funds and thus probably  can control  the shares  owned  by these funds.
3.8  In spite of the general  pattern of widespread  and passive share ownership  in the United
S3tas,  insitutional investors in that country have begun to play a lairger  role  n corporate
goverance.  This trend is sometimes  called "relationshlp  investing' because  the large institu-
tional shareholder  wants  to influence  the manaers  toDimprove  the pormance  of the company
and thus enhance  the return on the large shareholders investment  in the company. The most
cited exmple  of such an institution  is the Californiia  Public Employees Retirement  System
(Calpers),  a large public  pension  fund. Some  mutal funds have  also adopted  this philosophy. 1
3.9  Institutional  owners  monitor  perorace,  but are not themselves  experts  in the manage-
ment of any particuWl  business or industry.  The owners review and approve business and
financial  plans  for the enterpise prepared  by managem  but do not typically  develop  the plans
or arage  for financng  themselves  If the managers are incapable of developing appropiate
plans  and  strateies  for  improving  efdficiency  and  profitabiity,  the  response  of  the  large
instittionalowners typicaly would  be to replace  the managers  rather  man  carry out the duties
and responsibilities  of the full-time  managers.
Holding  Companies
3.10  The third model  only iosts in a minority  of companies  in Wester  countries,  but seems
to be the basis for proposals to create govemrment-sponsored  funds.  This model is  the
relationshipbetween  a holding  company  and its closely  held sub  ies  Other  examples  might
For example,  in 42 of the largest  German  companies,  three  bans cotol  on avcrage  45 percent  of the
shares  in these  companies.  ts  v  Bums, Buxbaum,  and  Hopt  (1993),  p. 75.
ob  "Corporate  Governance  Survey,"  p.  16.12  R. Anderson
include venture capital fimds and "turn-aroundw  funds that  specialize in providing management
expertise and capital to improve the operations of enterprises in which the funds are the major
owner.  Ih ts  model, the holding company would own at least 51 percent of the shares of the
subsidiary and often much more.
3.11  The holding company plays a more direct and acdve role in the day-to-day management
of the subsidiary.  Representatives of the holding company may be the only members of the
govemance boards of the subsidiaries.  Managers from the holding company may transfer to
positions in the subsidiary companies and vice versa.  The subsidiary is expected to provide
much more  freuent  and detailed reports  to  the holding company than would nonnally  be
provided to shareholders.  The holding company provides maagement  and technical expertise
to  help the  subsidiary develop its business plan and improve its operations.  The holding
company reviews investunt  decisions above a certain threshold and may also be responsible for
raisin  capital for the subsidiary.
3.12  Because the holding company owns most or aU of the shares of the subsidiary, it will
reap most or all of the gains in efficiency and profitability of the  subsidiary and thus has an
incentive to devote a substantial amount of its own resources to improve the operation of the
subsidiary.  A holding company that owned a smaller percentage of the shares would find that
increases in profits and dividends must be shared with other owners of the company.  In other
words, the other owners would be "free riders" on the efforts of the holding company.  This
would reduce the incentives for the holding company to devote a large amount of resources,
such as scarce managerial talent, to improving the operation of the subsidiary.  Also, a large
ownership percentage helps to guarantee that the holding company can control the enterse  and
ensure that its restructuring plan is carried out.
3.13  Those  who  favor govemment-sponsored funds  seem to  support  the  third  model of
corporate  goveance  smilar  to  a  holding  company  strucue  with  the  funds  acting  like  a
holding company.  In these cases, the government would determine the portfolio of each fimd,
appoint the goverance  boards for the fund, and select a management company for the fund.
Management companies for the funds would be staffed by management and financial exrts
drawn from intenational  consulting firms who can take an active day-to-day involvement in the
management of the companies and provide the manageial  and technical expertise that may be
lacking.  Furthermore, a fee stucte  would be established for the management companies that
will give them a strong financial incentve  to improve perfomance  of the enteprises  owned by
the fimds.  Supporters of govemment-sponsored funds doubt that private funds will ever have
this expertise and insist that only the govemment has the resources to create such funds.  Note
that a particular fund should then own a large proportion of the shares of a particular enterprise
(ceraly  more than 50 percent) to create maximum incentives for the fund to invest resources
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3.14  As an examle,  the mass  program in Poland is centred  on government-
sonsored  funds.  in this case, however, only 33 percent of the shares of a  oDmpany  will be
owned by a single fund calied the "lead" fund with smaller amounts of share  held by other
funds.  This  seems  to  raise  questions  about  whether  the  "lead"  fund  and  its  management
company will have the necessary incentives to  improve the efficiency and profitability of
enterprises. Incentives may be reduced for the lead fund because over two-thirds  of all increa
in profits would accrue to other owners of the enterpise,  creating a "free nder" problem.
4.  Governance  in the Czech and Slovak Republics
4.1  In  the  Czech and Slovak Republics, the funds initially assumed the fis  model of
disperd  ownersip.  The managers of these funds say that they modeled themselves after
mutual funds in the United States and Westem Europe and were primarily interested only in
providing a  diversified and attactive  portfolio of  shares for the voucher holders.  Some
sponsors of funds following Western models even attempted to offer a family of funds, for
example, a growth fund, an income fund, a small capitalization  fund, sector fiurds, and so forth.
Most fund managers did not have any plans initially to play an active role in the goveraace  of
enterprises.
4.2  These funds, however, realized that the situaton was different at the first annual meeting
of  the shholders  and have adopted the second model of institutional ownership.  They
discovered that three or four fimds together typically  owned a majority of shares in a partcu
enterpise,  and dtus they had the obligation to  elect the members of  the Supervisory and
Msanagement  Boards.  Not surprisingly, the funds elected thir  own rprsenives  to sit on the
boards.  After tat,  the representatives of the funds on the new boards had no choice but to
suprvise  and monitor the performance of management  and to review and approve business and
fiancial  plans.
4.3  The funds in the Czech and Slovak Republics, however, have not yet adopted the third
model of corporate govenance tpical  of holding companies.  In general, they have not tied
tD become the day-to-day managers of the enterprises or take on the responsibility of  isi
capital fr  restructuring or expansion. They have been forced to limit themselves  to encourage
edsting  managers to  improve opeations  and,  if necessary, to  replace managers who have
proven to be incapable.  This may be because the funds simply do not have the expert staff or
access to capital necessary to implement the third modeL  Also, as discussed in more detail
below, any single fund or group of funds with the same management  company is prohibited
from owning more than 20 percent of the shares of an enteprise,  thus effectively prohibiing
a fund from becoming a holding company.  If any one fund spent substantial  resources trying
to improve the profitability of a particular enterpnse, the other owners would receive a large
share of the benefit.14  R. Anderson
Govemance Boards
4.4  In all countries,  the s  lders  of a company  exercise  their  ownership  nrghts  through
the annual  meeting  of shareholders  at which  they  elect  one or more  boards  thit meet regularly
throughout  the year.  These boards have vaeious  names depending  on the country  but are
hereafter  referred to collectively  as "govrance  boards.'  The key to improved  corporate
governan.e  is the role, functions,  and composition  of these  boards. The struchtre  of govema
boards  in de Czech  and Slovak  Republics  seems  to be different  from most other countries.
4.5  A source  of confusion  in frying  to understand  the structure  and memberip  of these
various govemance  boards is the different  uses of the term 'director of a company.'  In the
United States, companies  have  a single  board which is called the Board of Directrs,  and a
member  of the board  is called  a director  of C:ie  company.  In Germany,  the term  director  instead
refers to a senior manager  of the company,  and the term  Board of Directors  means  a board  of
senior managers. Thus, a Board of Directors  in Gennany  is similar  to a senior management
committee  in the United  States. To avoid this confusion,  the term director  hereafter  is only
used to refer to the members  of the Board  of Directors  in the United  States. Senior  managers
in all countries  are simply  called  managers,  and a board of managers  is called  a Management
Board rather than  a Board of Directors.
4.6  Also  it is important  to distinguish  between  four types  of individuals  who may sit on the
governance  boards  in the Czech  and Slovak  Republics  and other counres.  These  are:
fi)  dira.  Thes  are prominent  figures in business  or academia  who are asked to
resent  dispersed  shareholders. They are not managers  or workers in the company
and do not represent  any particular  owner  or group  of owners.
({i)  mxor owners  If particular  owners  such  as funds  own substantial  blocks  of shmaes,  they
can select  individuals  to sit on the govenance boards.
(iii)  managagr. Senior managers  of the company  can be members  of certain governance
boards  depending  on the law in each  country.
(iv)  worker. Workers  may  sit on govemance  boards  as representatives  of the employees  of
the company  as a group  or class depending  on the law in each  country. 11
4.7  Because  powerful  interest  groups such  as major  owners, managers,  and workers may
elect individuals  to sit on the governance  boards, it is sometimes  assumed  that they are the
"'In those companies  with substantial  worker  ownership  of shares  (for example,  wESOP"  companies  in
the United  States),  workers  may  also sit on the boards  representing  those  workers  who  are shareholders
rather than  workers  as a group or dass.  In this latter case,  such  board  members  would  be included  in
the second  category  listed  above,  namely,  representatives  of major owners.Voucher  Funds  in the Transition  Economies  1  5
reprsnatvsof  those  intret  groups  and their  primary  responsibility  is to protect  or promote
the  interest  of those  groups.  This  is analogous  to a member  of Parliamient  who  represents  the
interests  of his or her  constituency.  Legally,  however,  a member  of a governanice  board  is
usually  required  to represent  the  collective  interet of all shareholders  rather  than  any  specific
shareholder  or interet group. In some  countries,  shareholders  can  bring  legal  action  against
board  memibers  who violate  this 'fiduciary'  responsibility  to promote  the interest  of all
sharholdrs.Whether  thius  happens  in practice  is another  matter.  Thouigh  this  paper  refers  to
"reresnttivs"of  major  interest  groups  sitting  on the  governance  boards,  this is perhaps  a
misleading  c-haracterization  of their  legal  position  on the  boards.
4.8  To understand  the-  structure  and  functioning  of governance  boards  in the  Czech  and
Slovak  Republics,  it is useful  to compare  them  with similar  boards  in Germany  and  the  United
States  (see  Table  2).  The  German  and  Czech/Slovak  models  are  simiflar  in that  they  have  two
governace  boards  while  the  United  States  has  only  one. The  functions  and  composition  of the
two  boards  in the  Czech/Slovak  model,  however,  are  subscantialy  different  from  the  German
model,,  and  some  argue  that  the  Czech/Slovak  model.  more  closely  resembles  the  U.S. model
because  most  power  is concentrated  in a single  board.
Table 2
Composition of Governance Boards
Czech  and  Slovak
United  States  JGermany  Republics
Board  of Directors  Supervisory  Board  Supervisory  Board
*  Outsiders  *  Outsiders  *  Outsiders
*  Managers  *  Major  Owners  *  Workers
0  Workers
Management  Board  Management  Board
a  Managers  a  Major  Owners
S  Managers
4.9  In the  U.S.  model,  the  single  governance  board  is the  Board  of Directors  and  is elected
by  the shareholders  at the annual  meeting.  Large companies  typically have  a dispersed
ownership  structure  with no  single  investor  owning  more  tha a few  percent  of the  total  shares.
Company  maaeetplays  a major  role  in selecting  who  will sit on this  Board  fthrgh  its
control  over  the  voting process  at the  annual shareholders  meeting.  Not surprisingly,  company
managers  prefer that they be elected to the Boad.  Management  also nomiates and  recom-
mends  to the shareholders  for their approval  "outside" diremtrs who are not themselves
managers  of the company. It is argued  that this results  in a Board largely dominated  and
controlled by the  incumbent  managers  of the company  that often puts the self interest of the16  R.  Anderson
manages ahead of the shareholders. Workers have no automatic right to have represenaves
on the  Board unless workers happen  to be significant shareholders.
4.10  In the German model, representatives of  shareholders and the managers sit on two
separa  boards.  Shareholders are  represented on  the Supervisofy Board.  Because lare
German companies  often have major  holdes  that own a large block of shares (most
notably, bank),  these shareholders elect their own representatives to sit on the Supervisoy
Board along with outside members who represent tie  many small shareholders.  Under the
German policy of 'co-determination," workers are allowed to elect ont-half of the Supervisory
Board.  The Supervisory Board in turn appoints senior managers to a Management Board.  The
Supervisory Board sets broad corporate policy while the Management  Board is in charge of the
day-to-day implementation of that policy.  A case can be made that the German model is
superior to the  U.S. since  esentaives  of large  solders  dominate  the Supevisory Board.
This avoids the conflict of interest and confused  objectives  that seems to characterize the Boards
of Direct  in U.S.  companes that are larely  dominated by the managers of the company.
4.11  Like the German model, the Czech and Slovak model has two boards, but the represen-
taives  of  the major shareholders in  most but not all cDmpaies  have chosen to sit on the
Management  Board rher  han The  Supervory  Board.  The current corpae  law in these two
countries appears tD  pemt  the shareholders at their annual meeting to elect members of both
boards.  Thus the shareholders of a Czech or Slovak company could choose to  follow the
German model and elect only managers to sit on the Management  Board.  listead,  the share-
holders (typically the voucher  funds) in  most companies have chosen to  elect their  own
repreentatives  to sit on the Management Board along with managers.  Some managers and
government officials have complained  ffiat this was not the intent of the law.
4;2  ln  this  unique Czech and  Slovak model,  the  Management Board  is  composed of
representatives of the funds and senior managers though the proportion varies fwnm  company  to
company.  Because of  the diference  in  composition between the boards in  Czech/Slovak
companis  and German companies, the finctions and role of the two boards are also different.
Both brad  corporate  policy and  day-to-day implementation are  the  responsibility of  the
Management  Board in most Czech  and Slovak companies. This board typically meets monthly.
In this regard, the Czech and Slovak companies are similar to U.S. companies were power is
concentrated  in a single board.
4.13  The Supervisory Board typically consists of two-thirds outsiders and one-third worker
resenaives  though sometimes the  fimds have also elected  their representaives  to this board
as well as the Mangement  Board.  This board typically represents the interest of smaller
shaeholders  and the workes  and only meets every two to four months.  One of its major
functions  is to appoint the  accnting/audit  firm for the company  and to certify that the  financial
accounts of the company are true and accurate.*  Voucher Funds in fe  Transition Economies -17
4.14  The fact that  the  funds chose to be represented on the  Management Board ither  than  te
Supe  isDry Board suggests that they do wish to play an active and strong role in corporate
governance and want to be involved in the management  of the company. In this respect at least,
the Czech and Slovak model is like the  holding company model.  When asked whether  g
representatves  of major shareholders and managers on the Management Board niight cause the
same conflict of interest and confused objectives as is argued to occur in U.S. companies, te
response from funds was a clear 'no."  The funds as major shareholders always maintain the
upper hand over managers because they elect both boards at the annual meetng and thus can,
if necesary,  replace managers who are on the Management Board.
Ownership  Structure
4.15  The final structr  of ownership of Czech and Slovak companies including the  impor-
tance of funds cannot be known with certainty until privatization is complete in these counties.
In the Czech Republic, this could be within a few months when the second wave of voucher
privatization is completed.  In the Slovak Republic, a second wave is not scheduled to begin
unil  the second half of this year.  The Slovak Republic also intends to use more "standardw
methods of prnvatizaton in which enterpises  are sold for cash rather than for vouchers.  In
these, cas,  the funds would  not  become  the major  owners  of  the enterpss.
4.16  Mjority  ownership of an enterprise  fgt.  2
by  three  or  four funds is liklfy to be quite  TYPICAL  COMPANY  OWNERSHIP
common in the Czech Republic and perhaps
to a lesser extnt  in the Slovak Republic (for
an example, see Fig. 2).  This patten  is the  2n  Fund
result of two factors:  20$
*  about 70 percent  or more of vouchers
are likely to be entrusted to voucher  3rd FuLnd
funds; and  1l%
*  current regulations  in both countries
do not permit  a  single fund to  own
more than 20 percent of the shares of  Other Funds
an  entrprise.  16%  Individuals
30%
Because many fumds  prefer to own the max-
mum proportion  of  shares permtted,  three or  four  funds are  liklMy  to  each own near  the
maximum of 20 percent of  shares with the balance split between other funds and individual
shareholders, resulting in the pn  of ownership illustrated in Fig. 2.
4.17  Similarly,  the  number and  size of  fiuds  cannot be known with  certainty until after
privatzation  is complete.  After the first wave, the total number of funds was 264 in the Czech18  H~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  Anderson
R-epublic  and 165  in the Slovak  Republic. Though  the riumber  of funds was large, ten to twenity
large funds dominate  the industry.  The first wave resulted  in the ten larest  funds in each
country owning  about 24 percent of the shares of all companies. Many of the largest funds
were founded  by the largest  domestic  banks  in the two countries  while itie others were founded
by insurance  companies,  private individuals,  and foreign banks.
4.18  I[n  addition to the first restriction noted above that a fund (or group of related funds)
cannot  own more tha  20 percent of the shares of a particular  enterprise, a second  restriction
is that afund cannot invest more than0  Opecet  of its total assets in the shares of asingle
company. These two  quantitative  restrictions  on the portfolio  of a fund are sometimes  confused
but have very different  objectives. The first restriction  limits  the ability of a fuind  (or group of
related funds) to exercise control over a particular enterprise. Thins  second  restriction forces
funds to own shares in at least ten different enterprises  and thus havie  a diversifie portfolio.
For large funds, this ten percent limit was generally  not binding,  while the 20 pericent  limit on
ownership  of the sLare of a single  company  was binding. A large fuind  could own 20 percent
of the shares of the largest companies,  and yet these  shares would  not amount  to more tha  ten
percent of the fund's total assets. For smaller  funds, the ten percent rule could be binding  and
force such funds toinvest only in smaller  companies  if they  wantecl  to own the maximum  of 2O
percet  of the share  or else own a smaller  percentage  of the shaev.-  in latrger  compamies.
Comparison  with Otiher  Countri'es
4.19  Perhaps more by chance  than by design, the Czech  and Slovak  Republics  have adopted
a system of corporate  governance  that resembles  the system  in Germany  more tha  any other
country.  The ownership  of enterprises  in the Czech  and Slovak  Republics  is dominated  by a
few large financial institutions,  namely, the voucher funds.  Most of the lairgest  funds were
founded  by the lairge  banks. Thus, like bank  in Germany,  the banks and their affiliated  funds
in the Czech and Slovak  Republics  will play a major role in corporate  governance.
4.20  Though no system of corporate governance  is perfect, the Germian  model based on
strong institutional  ownership  may be the best for these two countries  and perhaps for other
transition  economies  as well.  The U.S. model based on dispersed  ownership  has been subject
to increasing  criticismn  because shareholders  have few ways to minluence  poorly performing
managers. In such  cases, the only option  may be a 'hostile takeover"  in which  a large investor
or consortium  of investors  attempts  to buy a controlling  block of shares  and replace  the current
managers. Critics of the U.S. system argue tha laws should  be changed  to permit financial
institutions,  such as banlks  and mutual funds, to play a larger role in corporate  governance.
4.21  One  important  difference  between  the system  of corporate  governance  in Germany  and
in the Czech and Slovak Republics  is the role and composition  of the MaaeetBoard.
Representatives  of the large institutional  investors  in the Czech and Slovak  Republics  (voucher
funds) have chosen  to sit on the MaaeetBoard  while  representatives  of such investors  mn
Germany  (typically  large banks)  sit on the Supervsory Board.Voucher  Funds  in the Transition  Economies  19
4.22  The Czech and Slovak model may be,  an improvement  over the German model.  In
Germany, the Supervisoy Board may not be able to adequately  supervise and control the
Mlanagement  Board in ali cases  for at least two reasns.  First, because  workers  are represented
on the Supervisory  Board, managers  and rpentivsof  the large investors  may be reluctant
to discuss  critical issues  or to disclose  key information  to this board.  Second,  the Supervisory
Board only meets  a few times  each year and thus  may not give adequate  attention  to the detailed
problems of  the company.  The weaknesses  o)f  the Supervisory Board in Gennany are
illustrate by the recent  finacial difficulties  of Germany's 14th  largest  firm, MetaIlgeseflshaft.
In this case, the Supervisory  Board admitted  that it was not aware of the financial  problem  of
this company  until it was almost bankrupL' 2
4.23  Voucher  funds in the Czech and Slovak  have  indicated  a desire to play an active  role in
the maaeetof  the company  by choosing  to be represented  on the Management  Board along
with the managers  of the company. In particular, given the need for major restructuring  of
enterprises in these countries, this active role by the voucher funmds  should be encouraged.
Thoughi  mixing representatives  of owners  and managers  on the Management  Board may create
some unforeseen  difficulties,  this type of board has long excisted  in the United Sbtats  where the
Board of Diretor  consists  both of managers  and representatives  of shareholders.
Experience  to Date
4.24  How successful have the voucher  funds been in governing the enterprises in the Czech
and Slovak Republics?  In other words,  have the new owners brought about needed improve-
ments in efficiecy  and profitability of enterprise?  Unfortunately, the answer to this important
question is that it is probably too early to tell with any degree of certainty.  The voucher flmds
became the owners  of the enterprises  legally only after Apnil  1993 when the shares  of the
enteprpnses  were distributed to the voucher holders who successfully bid for the shares.  The
firs  annual meetings  of shareholders  of the companies  typically occuured  shortly afte  the
distribution  of shares. It was at this first annual  meeting  tha the voucher  funds could  elect  their
.representatives to the governace  boards of the enterprises and officially  exercise  their rights of
ownership.'1 3
12M  "Crort  Governance  Survey" (1994),  p. 14.
13Some  funds  did begin  to)  exercise  their ownership  rights  in the fail of 1992  under  the sponsorship  of the
National  Property  Fund (NPF). Until the shares  were distributed  to the funds  and other new  sharehold-
ers, the National  Property  Fund exercised  the ownership  rightL  of the State. During  this time,  the NPF
appointed  board members  for those enterprises  included  in the voucher  privatization.  The NPW  chose
to take a passive role and ap.pointed  rpentivsof  the voucher funds  who had purchased  shares  in
the enterprises in the voucher auctions to sit on the boards of enterprises as early as the fallofl1992,
even though  the voucher  funds were not yet technically  the owners.20  R.  Anderson
4.25  Funds have varous  policies about who will represent them on the boards of enteprises.
The management company for a large fund may have something like 50 employees and have
r1ep  atives  on 90 or more boards.  Funds may also appoint non-employees to sit on the
boards to supplement their own employees.  Attending board meetings is an important and time
consuming acdvity for the fund's employees.  Most companies pay a fee to board members for
each meeting attended.  The typical fee is between 2,000 and 5,000 crowns in either the Czeh
or Slovak Republics (roughly $64 to $160 at the current exchange zates).  This fee is kept by
the board memnber  rather than the fund and, in effect, helps to pay the salaries of fund employ-
ees.  Some companies complained that some board members wanted to increase the number of
metings  to increase their fees.  Others said that at least one fund had tried to  ase  the fees paid
to board members.
4.26  The quality and experience of board members no doubt vary considerably.  On the one
hand, a fimd sponsored by a foreign bank claimed that its board members were expeienced
busiessmen  and could make substantial contributions to the management of the enterpnses.  On
the otier  hand,  some managers complained about the board representatives from the  fimds
founded by  large  domestic  banks.  These  bank  funds  often  appointed local  bank  branch
managers to sit on the boards.  One complaint was that they contributed litde to the manage-
ment of the company and were only interested in  receiving the fee paid to  board members.
Another complaint was that some board members sit on too many boards.  It is argued that they
do this only to collect the fees and are unable to give adequate time and effort to each board.
4.27  One concern of some fund managers is the govenment  requirement that a fund may not
own more than 20 percent of  the shares of a single company.  They argue  that this creates
difficulties in supervisng  and controlling managers and selling a controlling block of shares to
an outside investor.  The fumds  that own large blocks of shares in the company must agree on
major changes in the management of the company.  In effect, a single fund can often veto and
block these changes.  Similarly an outside investor who wishes to buy a controlling block of
shares, say more than 51 percent, must negofiate  and reach agreemne with several funds.  Bach
may be a holdout with unrealistic demands for a high price  for its shares in the company.
4.28  Discussions  with  fund  managers  suggest  that  their  activities  to  improve  governance  and
etrucstu  enterprises  can  be  divided  into  three  categones.  These  are:
*  eliminating  fraud  and  self  dealing  by  managers.  A common  complaint  in aU transition
economies  is  that  the  managers  of  some  enterprses  have  schemed  to  transfer  the  assets
of the enterprises to themselves or to benefit unfairly at the expense of the future private
owners of the enterprises.  This is sometimes called 'spontaneous privatization."  For
example, one scheme allegedly used by managers of a Stae-owned company is to create
a pivate  company owned by the managers perhaps with a foreign partner and then enter
into contracts with fte  Sate-owned company that unfirly  enriches the pnvate company.
The fumds  say  th  they have been able to stop most such schemes by the managers and
in effect preserve the assets of the entrise  for the new owners.*Voucher  Funds  In the Transition  Economies-  21
lo0otef  .aV  ftbliyio  mns  The  funds say that they initialy  have
emphasized  low-cost  imprvments  in the operations  of the companies. Contray to the
belief held by some, the funds argue that much  restructuring  can be carried  out without
larg  new investmnents.  These include  reducing the work force,,  closing unprofitable
facilities, improved  marketing  efforts, and increased  attention  to quality. Though the
funds say that they are promoting  such  low-cot efficiency  improvements,  there is mixed
evidence  that former State-Owed enterprises  now under the control  of funds are in fact
reducing the size of their work forces. The unemployment  rate in the Czech Republic
is  remakably low, about thre  percet,  in spite of  the common belief that Czech
enterprise  previously had substantial  surplus workers that were not needed.  This
suggests  that enterprises  have  not been reducing  the size of their work forces. Other
argue that the booming  private  sector  has hired most of the workers  that have  been fired
by the former State-owned  enterprises  thus keeping  unemployment  low. There does not
seem any clar  answer to this question.
*  highsa-Lcstremctring,  Until the managers  have shown that they can introduce the
low-cost efficiency improvements,  some funds are unwilling  to consider large new
investmnents  for modernization  and expansion. Also the low-cost efficiency  improve-
ments  will generate  additional  cash flow that can help to finace  the high cost improve-
ments.  The funds themselves, however, typically  do not have any special access to
capital  for large new  investments. They can only encourage  the enterprises  to increase
internal cash flow and to seek funds from traditional  sources such as bank loans.
4.29  Sometimes, fth funds have forced companies to  remove corrupt or  incompetent
manaers.There  are at least two reasons, however,  why funds have refrimned  in most cases
from replaidng  managers:
*  The firs  reason is that there is a general shortage of managers with the necessary
training  and experience. This is not surprising  since  the managers  of enterprises  in these
countries  though  usually  highly intellient and hard working  may have  little experiece
with the operations  of a miarket  economy. Thus the flmds say that it is often better to
help the existing managers improve their skils  rather tha  try to find replacements
which may not have the necessary  skills either. It must also be Doted  that fund manag-
ers are also likely to be inexperienced  and lackng  in  skills.  Just like enterprise
managers,  fund nmaagers  must improve  their skils and knowledge  of the operations  of
a market economy.
*  The second  reasn  is that there may be some political or public pressure not to remove
managers.  In general, there is political opposition to large powerful funds, and the
funds may be reluctant to take steps that are unpopular  though  necessary  for the long
term improvement  of the economy, for example, replacng managers  or reducing the
work force of an enterprise. One  fund manager  suggested  thiat  after the second  wave  of
voucher privatization is completed, the funds may be more wilg  to replace managers22  R. Anderson
and make  other  major  changes  in the operations  of the  companies,  including  reducing  the
work force.
4.30  Though only a few enterprise  managers  were intrviewed, they in general seemed  to
favor the role of funds  as the new  owners  of enterprises. Some  managers  felt tht  the enterpris-
es were unable  to take action to improve  their situation  during the privatization  process and
while under Sta-ownership.  Only  now with  prvate owners  do the managers  feel free to make
major changes  in their companies. They  are reieved to be able  to propose  new  plans to their
new owners  and obtain  approval  and autorizion  from them  to carry out those  plans.
4.31  This is not to say, however,  that there are no complaints  about the role of the funds  in
corporate  governance. Criticism  of the role of funds  is more  pronounced  among  government
officials and others in Slovalda. This may result from the belief of some Slovamans  that
voucher  privatization  and the voucher  funds were created  by Czechs  in the former combined
Republic  and imposed  upon Slovakia. Some  argue  that the managers  of the new  voucher  funds
are not good owners of enterprises. They are described  as 'cowboy" capitlists who made
unrealistic  promises  to vouciSer  holders, will sell shares in the newly  privafized  companies  at
low prices to foreigners  to raise  cash to fulfill  these  promises,  are only intrested in short-term
profit at the expense of the long-term  development  of the economy,  and have no capital  or
expertise to  contribute to  restructuring of enterpris.  In addition, most large  funds were
created  by banks  and further  increase  what some  view as the already  excessve economic  power
of banks  over enterprises. Other  funds were created  by managers  of enterprises  to buy shares
in their own enterprs  and thus limit outside control.  Some managers  of enterprises  are
complaining  about the interference  of the funds  in their management  of the companies,  believe
that managers  are best qualified  to be the new private owners, and thus favor privatzation
programs that give managers  and workers  majority  ownership.
4.32  As noted above  in  par.  2.9, an important  function  of the voucher  funds  is to sell their
shares to another  investor, for example  a foreign  company,  if that mvestor  is likely to have a
better plan for the management  of  a company.  In practice, there seems to have bem few
examples  thus  far of the funds  in the Czech  and Slovak  Republics  selling  a controlling  block  of
shares to a new investor  who wanted  to take over the management  of an enterprise.  Several
reasons have been  given for this including:
*  few investors  have  been  interested  in purchasing  an existing  Czech  or Slovak  company.
Instead  they have  preferred  either  to start a new company  or to form a joint ventre with
an existing  company;
*  the funds have unrealistic  expectations  as to the value of the enterise  shares and
believe  tat  they can do as good  ajob as the outside  investor  in improving  the efficiency
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*  the price for shares,  in particular,  in the Czech  Republic,  have  rise  to high levels  on
the stock market,  and investors  are unwiling  to match  these  prices;  and
*  investors  find  it difficult  to arrange  a purchase  of  a company  because  the ownership  is
spread  among  thre  or four  voucher  funds  plus  many  small  owners. In particular,  the
funds  cannot  agree  among  themselves  whether  to sell..
4.33  One issue is the guarantees  or promises  tha some funds made  to voucher  holders  to
convince  tern  to become  shareholders  in the funds.  The most notable examnple  was the
Harvard  Fund that  promised  that  a share  in the fund  would  be worth  ten times  the registration
fee,  charged  by the government  for a voucher.  This fund was the first large fund to be
established,  and some say that its success  in attracting  members  was a major factor  in the
popularity  of funds  and encouraging  citizens  to participate  in the voucher  program. Some  other
funds made  pronmie of various  type  as well.  Initially  there was some concern  about  the
impact  of these  promises,  for example,  would  the fuinds  have  to sell  share in their  portfolio  to
raise  cash  to honor  thei promises. The  feeling  among  government  of  ficias and fund  managers
now  is that  these  promises  or guarantees  are not a serious  problem. At least  in part, this  is due
to the high price of enterprise  shares on  fth secondary  market,  in particular,  in the Czech
Republic,  and thus the high value of  fund shares compared  with the value guaranteed  or
promised  by the funds.
5.  Three Enterprise Case  Studies
5.1  The following  gives  thre  examples  of how enterprises  in the Czech  Republic  largely
owned  by the voucher funds are governed  and the success  to date of the new owners  in
imprvingefficiency  and profitability.  The  examples  include  a successful  company,  an average
company,  and a faiing company.  These  enterprises  are now  predominately  owned  by funds  but
are still  partialy owned  by the State  (shares  are typically  held  by the National  Property  Fund).
Successful  Company
5.2  Beginning  in 1959,  the former  Czechoslovakida  owned  an ocean  shipping  company  called
Czechoslovak  Ocepan  Shipping. It curretly has about 18 ships  transprting cargo all over the
world  and a labor force of about  1,000. In the first wave  of voucher  prvtzain  four  funds
ended  up owning  more  tha  50  percent  of the company. About  30 percent  of the company  is
still owned  by a special  Stat holding  company  called  HNOP though  this is likly to be sold  to
private  nvesto.
5.3  This company  can be called  successful  but not because  of the efforts of the currnt
owneurs. In contrast to most other entmprises in the Czech and Slovak Repubics,  ts  company
has always  operated  on cmercial  principles  and had to compexte  with many other private
ocean shipping  companes.  It was sucessful because  Czech  crews  were low cost but had a24  R. Anderson
reputatin  for high quality. It had access to loans from foreign sources because the ships could
be used as collateraL This company does not suffer to the same eaxtat as other Czech compa-
nies from the current recession in the Czech economy since its customers are  from many
countijes.  It does not have significant surplus labor, and no major restuturing  is required.
5.4  The only complaint by the managers is that the funds do not understand the ocean
shipping business though there are no major conflicts  between the owners and the managers.
ITe Management  board plays the major role in corporate govemance  and meets once a month.
it is composed  of the Managig  Diector of the company, representatives  of the four fimds, and
a representative  of FINOP.  According  to mnaers,  the fimd representatives  tend to emphasize
short-term gains i  efficiency  and profitability  while the managers  tend to emphasize  long-tem
growth and  qpansion. The Supervisory  Board consists of two employees  and a represtie
of FINOP.  Is primary functions  are to approve the financial  statments  of the company  and the
dvidend  payout
Average Company
5.5  An example  of-  an average company  is Stavomont  PiAa,  a constuction company
specalizing  in fitting  out office  buildings. It was split  from a large  construction  conglomerate
in 1990. Managers  and employees  had  hopes  that  they  could  purchase  the entrprise, but in the
end it was scld primarily to the voucher funds.  Thre  large funds own about 52 percent of the
sha  with the balance splt  among other funds, the workers, individual  ivetors,  and te
Natonal Property Fund.  The employees  ended up owning 13 percent. The National Property
Fund only owns 10 percent, and this is likely to be sold in  the second wave of voucher
5.6  The Maagement  Board is dominnt  and is composed of rpresentatives of the three
fuds,  the General Drectr,  and the Prduction  Director.  It  meets once a  month.  The
Supeviory  Board is composed  of an employee  representative, representatives  of two of the
large funds, and a well-known  professor of economics. It meets eight times a year (about every
six weeks).
5.7  The company  faces increased  competiftion  from other former State-owned  enterprises  and
new private companies. In partcular, competiton is intense  from companies  that use low-wage
foreg  wors  from such counties as the Ukraine and Rumania.  It has sold some of its
prouction  facties  and reduced its work force from 1,200 to 550.  'he  fund rsentives
on ffie Mnagement Board have approved  and encouraged  th  restucturing, and there are no
major conflicts between  the managers and the owners. With good management,  this company
is likely to survive even in the fice of increased competiton.Voucher Funds in the Transition Economies  25
Faling  Company
5.8  Tesla Karlin is an example  of a company  that must dstdcally  downsize and may
evenually cease to opeate  because  of fundametal changes in the Czech econmy  and its
trading  relationships  wiLth  other  countries. This company  was once  part  of the lirge telecommu-
nications  conglomeate in Czechoslovakia,  and it specializes  in the manufacure of telephone
switching  equipment.
5.9  Before the break up of the former Eastrn  European  tading block, this company  was
one of just a few companies  that supplied  telehone switching  equipment  for the entire  Eastern
block and was considered  one of the most technologically  advanced  companies  in ffie  region.
It was unable, however,  to keep  up with the latest  advances  in switching  technology  because  it
did not have access to the more modem Western microprocessors  that are at the heart of
modem digital telephone  switches. As a result when the telephone  switching  market in the
Eastern block countries was opened to foign  competition,  Tesla could not compete  with
Siemens,  Alcatel,  and other Western  companies.
5.10  The company  may survive for a few years due to a joint venture partrship  with
Siemens.  When Siemens was given a contract to supply digital switches for the Czech
telephone  network,  it was required  to carry out some  -nufcring  localy and thus  formed  the
joint venture with Tesla  After the end of the current  contract,  however,  the joint ventue will
end, and Tesla vill not be able to compete  in the market  for  digil  switches. Tesla  pmbably
can confinue  to produce  certain  anclary equipment  for switches  or replacement  equipment  for
older switches,  but this wili require a much smaller  work force.
5.11  Not srprisingly, Tesla  was not consider  an attactive company  in voucher  pratiza-
don.  Funds only  purchased  31 percent  of its shares  but still ended  up controlling  the company.
The National  Property  Fund  still owns  20 percent  with  the balance  held by small  investors. The
dominant Management  Board consists of  presentatives  from the three largest finds,  the
Geneal Director of the company,  the Finance  Directr,  a rpresentative of the joint venture
company, and a repxesentative  of  the National Pperty  Fund.  It  meets monthly.  The
Supevisory Board consists  of two workes, two representatives  of the smaller  funds, and two
outsiders  esenting  the individual  shareholders. It only meets  twice  a year.
5.12  The  Management  Board  asked  for and received  a buiess  and financial  plan to deal  with
the necessary  findamental  restucuing  of the company. With Board approval,  the company
plans to reduce  staff from 1,400  to 1,000  by the end of 1993  and fiuther  reductions  are likly.
The managers seemed happy wnth the quality of the rpresettives  on the Board.  The
representative  of a fund  founded  by a large Czech  bank is the former branch manager  for that
bank that primarily dealt  with the company. In contrast  to complaints  from some  managers  of
other companes about local bank managers, the managers  of Tesla believe that this board
rresentative  is familiar with the company  and is an effective  member of the board.  The26  R. Anderson
representative  of  a fund founded  by a  foreiga bank is a Czech citizen with cnsiderable
Westem  business  experience  who has provided  advice  on the restructuing of the company.
6.  Undesirable  Fund Behavior
6.1  Perhaps  the key policy issue for countries  with a voucher  privaizaton program  is the
regulatory  ftamework  for funds.  Even if the government  does not wish to see funds estab-
lished, it is very difficult  to stop millions  of citizens  from forming  organizations  of various
kinds to pool their vouchers  if they see a benefit  from doing  so.  Such a pooling  of vouchers
could be done by exsting companies,  members  of an extended  family, groups in the work
place, private clubs, and so forth.  Thus recognizing  that privately-sponsored  funds will be
created, the best policy is to put in place a regulatoxy  framework  to mitigate any adverse
impacts  of their opeatons  and  to accenuate their positive  contributions.
6.2  One option  for a regulatory  framework  is to treat funds  like all other  corporatos.  in
other words, whate  regulatory  framework  is set up for corporations  would also apply to
voucher funds.  In Western countries, the regulatory framework  for mutual funds and fr
corporations  are similar. Thus, the  analysis  below  of the appropriate  regulatory  framework  fa
voucher  funds also largely  applies  to all corporations.
6.3  Before discussing a regulaty  fiamework, it is desirable to explicidy identify the tpes
of fund activities  or behavior  ftiat  are harmful  to the operation  of the economy  and thus  which
may need  to be controled through  regulation. Too often  discussions  of prposed regulations  do
not identify  the behavior  that the regulation  is meant  to controL In many  tansitio  economies,
vague  complaints  and concems  are expressed  about  the opeation of fimds,  but little  analysis  has
been made  as to whether  these concerns  are valid and justify regulation.
6.4  Much of the concern  about  the new  fimds  is the result of suspicion  of any new  powerful
oganizaton that may control  vast economic  remsources.  Funds are a new  idea to the govem-
mess and citi  of transiton economues,  and they are concerned  about  the potental economic
or political  power of the funds.  After having thomwn  off the yoke of Communist  central
planning,  citzens may  be worred that their economic  future  is now in the hands  of a few  large
fimds  over which  they have no controL This suspicion  of concentatons of economic  power
and weal  als  has a long  traditon  in  Westn  countnes  leading  to "populist  movementsW  tha
demanded  the government  control  and regulate  holding  companes, combines,  trusts, and other
-malefactors of great wealth.  "
6.5  The essence  of a market  economy,  however.  is that apparent  economic  power is greatly
limited  by competition. Huge seemingly  powerful  organizations  such as General  Mots  or
IBM have been humbled  by competitive  preures.  Ownership  of large economic  ruces
does not necessarily  transate into econonic  power if markets  are competidve. Furthermore,
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if the  funds  are  going  to play  a useful  role in corporAte  governanice  and  the  rsucrigand
modenizaionof  enteirises  in thec  transition  economies.  Eliminatinig  the  power,  of flmds  ove
the  enterprises  out of vague  concerns  about  undesirable  concenwtratons  of economic,  power  could
crpple the  of the trnsition economics  for years  to come.
Monopolization
6.6  Voucher funds may engage in four types  of undesirble  behavior  that might  justify
goverment  regulation.  The  firs  is monpoiztion.  A single  fund  may  obtain  an  influential
or controlling  ownership  interest  in two or more  enterprises  in the  same  industry  or markt
The  fund could  then  influence  the two entrprises  to cooperate  in settg  prices  instead  of
competing.  This  increased  market  concentration  could  lead  to reduced  competition,  and  higher
prices.
Shirking
6.7  The  second  type  of undesirable  behavior  is shirking.  Managers  of funds  including  thie
management  companies  may  shirk  their  responsibilities  to inremas  the  vaule  of the  finds ansts
on  behaf  of the  sharholders  of the fund  - in ote  words, they simply  do not try very hard.
The  nee  company  has  been  hired  to cairy  out  the  tee  fntctions  noted  above  beginning
on  pamp  2.1 (providing  a diversified  portfolio,  picing unearvalued  companies,  and  corp
governancei).  Instead,  the  maaeetcompany  may  simply  be  content  to receve  a manage-
ment  feeo  frm  the  fund but devote  few resources  to mprng  the manam  of the  fund's
portfolio.
v8  As a comparison,  shirking  by managers  of lArge  companies  is argued  to be  a serious
problem in  both Weste  and  transitin economies  and is the basic  reas  some  argue  that  the
system  of goverace of  iarge  companies  needs  to be improved. As  it  major  owner of
companies,  the  funds  in transition  economies  can play an important  role in improving  nihe
governance  of companies. The  problem,  however,  is the  goverMance  of the  funds  themselves
to  assure  that  fund  maneolrs  are  performing  to  their  iarximm  potential.  Thus,  the  introduction
of voucher  f-nds nm  trannstion  economies  may  oly  have  shifted  the problem of corporate
governance  from  the  companires  to the new funds.
6.9  A key  issue  is what  government  regultions  can  be  put  in pae  mto  improve  the incendivs
for fund  managers  to,  better  manage  the fund. As  a starting  point,  what  are the likely  incentives
for fund  managers  to work hard  to impiove  the  of the  fund? There  are at least
thre incentives:
*  the  management  company  receives  a fee  usually  stited  as  a percentage  of the  value  of
the fud's  ases.  I  the  manageme  company  can  increase  the value  of the fumd's
assets,  its fee increases.  A management  company  can  do this  i  at least  two ways:  (d  )
buying  shar  in  undervalued  companies  whose  pinces  wll  inse  when  other  investors28-  R. Anderson
realize  the true value  of these  companies;  and (ii) working  to improve  the performance
of the companies  in which  the find owns  shares  and thus  increasing  the value  of those
shams.  The second  of these  two ways  is the most  important  for the improved  perfor-
mance  of the economy  and thus should  be encouraged  by government  polcies and
regulons;
O  thie fund shareholders  at the annual meeting  of shareholders  can elect a  different
Supervisory  or Management  Board  if the shareholders  are dissatisfied  with the perfor-
mance  of the fund. These  boards  then  have  complete  legal  authority  to replace  a poorly
performing  management  company  with another  company  that they think will perform
bet.  Though  the many  shareholders  in the  large  fimds  may  find  it difficult  to orgai
effective  opposition  to ffie  current  fund managers  and elect  a different  Supervisory  or
Management  Board, this is a risk that the management  company  must face if it is
peroring  poory;  and
*  the management  company  will wish to improve  its reputation  as a good manager  of
funds. If it develops  a good  reputation,  the company  may be asled to manage  other
funds  or it may be successful  m establishing  new funds  that attract  many  investors.
Self  Dealing
6.10  The third type  of undesale  behavior  is self dealing. Even worse dtan  shirking by the
fund  managers  is if they  use  their  contol over the  fund's assets  to enrich  themselves  or promote
the interests  of individuals  or organizations  other  than the shareholders  of the fund. This type
of behavior  can be termed  self dealing,  conflict  of interest,  or outright  faud.  Any  acivity of
the fund's managers  should  have only one objective,  namely,  promoting  the interest of the
fund's shareholders.
S.II  As a compason, managers  of enterpises in the  tanion economies  have  often  been
accused  of such  self dealing,  and thus  it is argued  that the enterprises  need  strong  owners  who
can control  this behavior. The funds  can be these  stog  owners. Ihe problem,  however,  is
what will stop  the managers  of the funds  from egaging in the same  type  of behavior  that the
managers  of the enterpises have  been accused  of in the past?  Conflicts  of intrest  or self
dealing  may occur  between  the fund  managers,  the management  company,  the sponsor  of the
fund (for example,  a bank),  and the companies  owned  by the fund.
6.12  An example  of self dealing  might  be if the fund  managers  sell shares  at an un  ably
low pnrce  or buys shares  at a high  price. The  purpose  of such  transacons might  be to benefit
the sponsor of the fund, the management  company  or its employees,  or other affiliated
companies.  in such  transactions,  the shareholders  of the fund are harmed  because  the value  of
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6.13  The major  problem  in identifying  and controlling  this tYpe  of behavior  is defining  what
is meant  by an unreasoably "low"U  price or "high' price.  For examnple,  when  a fund SellS  any
shares  from its portfolio,  it is always  subject  to the criticism  that the price would  have  gone up
in the future and thus the fond sold  too early.  This type of decision,  however,  is not the type
of behavior  that is of concer  since the fund maaeetmust  always make  decisions  about
when  is the right time  to buy or sell share.  What  is of concern  is if the fuind  managers  sell the
shares  to a favored  buyer for less tha  the fund could  receive  from another  buyer or pay more
to a favored  seller that they would  have to pay to another seller.
6.14  As a second  example  of self dealing,  regulatry  authorities  in the United States  have
recently raise  concern about fund managers  using  the fund's immense  fiancial resources  to
manpultethe  prices'of shares  owned  by the managers  themselves. If a lairge  fund  decides  to
buy shares of a particular enterprise, this could cause the share price to rise,  If the fund
managers  persnally own shares  in thius  enterpris in addition  to shares  owned  by the fund, they
could use iLcf ability  to control  the fund  to raise the price of these shares  for their own  benefit
6.15  An example  of an alleged  conffict  of interest  is that  large funds  in the Czech  and Slovak
Republics  are controlle by the large banks. Thus banks  are major  lenders  to an enterprise  and
probably  can control  the maaeetof  the enterprise  through  their control  of the funds. It is
argued that the banks may freenterprises  to adopt polices that benefit themselves  as the
lenders  rather tha  benefit  the fund shareholders. For eammple,  a fund under the control  of a
bank might  insist that an enterprise  only borrow from the bank and on terms favorable  to the
bank- Of course, this situation  also exsts in Germany  where banks  are both  lenders  and major
sharholersof  latrge  enterprises. A further  complication  is tha the funds  founded  by the  banks
are also owners  of shares in the banks.  Bank  control  of funds could become  a way for bank
managers  to stop  any outside  investors  from controlling  the banks.
6.16  A second  example  of conflict  of interest  is the concern  in Russia  that managers  of large
enterprises  or industry  associations  may establish  funds  for the sole  puirpose  of controlling  their
own enterprise  or industry. The managers  may be able to force workers  in their enterpris to
turn over thei vouchers  to funds created  by the managers  or even use enterprise  capital  to buy
vouchers.
High Risk Investments
6.17  The fourth typ  of undesirble behavior by funds is making high nisk investments.
MAanagers  of funds may  have incentives  to engage  i nrsky investment  strategies  that are not in
the interest of :fund  shareholders. It is difficult  to see, however,  why -fund  managers  would
have a greater  incentive  to engage  in high risk investments  compared  to the fundshrole.
it is conceivable  that such incentives  may arise  from the system  frLr  compensating  or rewarding
the maaeetcompanies.  If a compensation  system  rewards  a Large  increase  in the value  of
the fund's portfolio but does not equally penaize a large decrease, then the mngmn30  R.  Anderson
companies  may  choose  a high  risk investment  strategy  causing  the  value  of the fund's assets  to
fluctuate  greatly.
6.18  In the  Czech  and Slovak  Republcs,  for example,  the compensation  for the  management
company  is set equal  to a fixed  percentage  of the  value  of the  assets  of the  fund, typically,  one
to two percent. Thus if the  value  of the  fund's assets  rise,  the  management  company  benefits
proportionately.  If the  value  fills, the magemet  company  suffers  prortionately.  With  this
kind  of compensaion  system,  the management  company  would  have  no reason  to prefer  highly
risky investments.  Though  regulatory  authrities in many  countries  try to prohibit  funds  from
engagig  in high risk investments,  it is not clear that there  is a great  need  for such  regulation.
7.  Options for Regulation
7.1  There are many  posible reguatory  options  for controlling  or limiting  the four  ps of
undesirble  behavior  desczibed  above. Table  3 provides  a list  of 27 options  including  those  that
are  sometmes  used  in Western  countnes  (shown  i  italcs in the table)  and others that have
been  prposed for transition  economies. The table also shows  the paagraph number  of this
report  in which  that option  is discussed  in more  detail. The  fact that many  regulations  have
been  prposed  does not necessarly  mean  that detailed  and compLcated  regulation  of funds  is
desirable. As discussed  in more  detail  below,  it is  probably  best  that  the regulation  of fuids be
kept  simple  until  experience  shows  which  regulations  may be needed. Many  of these  options
may  aldy  be included  in the corporate  law governing  the  strucure and operations  of all
coports.  The followmg  discusses  these options  and how they might  be applicable  to
tniton  eonomies  with funds.
7.2  These  regulatory  options  can be divided  into five broad  types:
*  regulaio  a promote  competition;
*  regulatons that require  greater ifomation  dislosure so that fund shareholders  can
better  monitor  and control  the performance  of fumd  managers;
o  regulations  ta  give fund  shareholders  greater  rights  and powers  in the goverance of
the funds;
*  reguations  that  limit  or control  certain  undesirable  operations  and  activities  of the  funds;
and
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Table  3
Regultory  Options
Undesirable  Possible Regulation
Behavior  (Ialics indicates  reVlation sometim  used in Westen  countries.)
Monopolization 1.  appy  merger  laow  tofinlds  (see  para. 7.4)
2.  lmIxt  fund ownrship to 5% of company  (pam 7.6)
_______  3.  linits on total sue of a fld  ra 7.7)
Shirking  4.  disclosure  of auted  financial  results  (an  7.11)
5.  shareholder  righs, eg. proceduresforprxy solitions  (para 7.23)
6.  incentive contracts  with management  companies  (para. 7.31)
7.  selection  of management  company  and contact must be approved  at anmnal
meeting of shareholders  (para. 7.26)
S.  management  fees paid in fimd shares with no resale for fixed period (para.
7.31)
9.  require funds to be "open ended" (para. 7.18)
10. require funds to be corporations  rather dan  unit trusts (para 7.20)
11. minimum  capital requirements  (para. 7.29)
Self Dealing,  12. limits on managementfes  (para 731)
Conflict  of  13. separate  cgstody  offind assets  (para.  7.29)
Interst, or  14. audits  offinncia  _tas  (para.  7.11)
Fraud  15. disdosure  of ownership  connecions  betuwe sponsor,  management
company,  f;id,  and  enterprises  (para.  7.12)
16. disclosure  of all commercdal  agreements  between  sponsor,  mangeme
conpany,  fimd. and nteprises (para 7.12)
17. disdosure of prices paid and received  for sales of shares in fimd portfolio
par. 7.13)
18. prohibition against sale of shares at below current "market  price" or
purchase  at above current "market  price" (part. 7.32)
19. restrictions on who can sit on governance  boards (para. 7.24)
20. prohibition of certain  ownership connections,  e.g. banks may not be
owners of management  companies  or funds may not own shares in
management  companies/sponsors  (pan.  7.33)
21. prohibition of commercial  agreements,  e.g. between management  company
and enterprses owned by fund (para 7.36)
22.  limit on percent ownership  of an entprise  by a fund, e.g. 20% (par.
7.38)
High Risk  23. discdosure  of iesmen  stagy  tara. 7.14)
Investments  24. shareholder  approval  of changes  in  invsmnen  strategy  (para 7-26)
25. limits  onfwzd borrowing  or leverage  &ara.  7.37)
26.  ni,r&  on  percent  of fud  assets  investd in single  entrprise, e.g. 5% Oara.
737)
27. lImits  on investment  in risky  assets  (para.  7.37)32  R. Anderson
The following  discusses  each  of these  types  of regulations  and how they reduce  one or more  of
the four kdnds  of undesirable  behavior.
Promote  Competition
7.3  Funds should  not  become  vehicles  for creating  monopolies  or engage  in anti-competitive
behavior  that results  in high monopoly  prices  paid by consumers. In partcular, this may  occur
if a fund owns  a significant  shareolding in two or more companies  selling  similar  products  in
the same markeL As an influental owner, the fund can direct the two companies  to charge
higher prices and avoid price competiion.  In effect, the common  ownership  by the fund  can
amount  to a merger  between  the two companes and ajoint business  and pricing  strategy. If the
two enterpris  together  only accwt  for a smal share  of the market  (including  imports  if the
product or service  can  be imported),  such  a merger  would  not significantly  reduce  competiton
and is thus of little concern.
7.4  Such a merger  via a fumd  is no different, however,  from other types of mergers (for
example, one company  buying  aU  or part of another company,  or two companies  joining to
form a combined  third company). Government  laws and regulations  dealing  with mergers  or
other anti-competitive  behavior  should  also apply  to activities  of funds. If the competition  laws
of the country  are soundly  constructed,  there should  be no need  for special  laws  or regulations
applicable  only to funds.
7.5  For example,  many  countries  require  two or more companis that are planning  to merge
to notify  the anti-monopoly  agency  and obtain  advance  approval  from that agency  if the merger
would significantly  reduce competition. Two companies  are considered  to have merged  if a
hird company  such  as a fimd  has purchased  shares  in the first two companies  sufficient  to give
it influence over their business  activities.  Naturally, the merger or competiton law in a
particular  country  has to define  how large a shareholding  must  be before  the fund  is consdered
to have  influence  over the business  activities  of the  companies  in its portfolio,  but this definition
should  apply equally  to a flmd  or any other company  buying  shares in another  company. For
example,  if a fund  purchases  more than five percent  or more of the shares in two companies
operating in the same mark  then this could  be considered a merger and subject to reviw  by
the anti-monopoly  agency.
7.6  This concern  about funds reducing  competition  could also be dealt with by prohibiting
a fund  from owning more han asmall  fiacon  of the  shares in  any company,  say up to five
percent.  As a result,  a fund has no influence over any enterprise and thus cannot engage in
anti-competitive  activities. Though  such a restiction might be effective  from a competition
policy point of view, it would  elimate  any positive  role that funds could play in corporate
governanoe  and improving  the efficiency  and profitability  of enterprises. Such a draconian
provision  is not necessary  if the government  has an effective  merger  policy  that  applies  to funds
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7.7  Beyond  encouraging  competition  among  enterprises,  regulations  may also encourage
competiion  among  funds. An option  to promote  competition  among  funds  is to limit the total
size  of a fund. In the Czech  and Slovak  Republics,  a fund  or group  of related  funds  may not
own more than ten percent  of all the shares  held by funds. Such a restriction  may promote
competition  in the-  market  for fund  services  or in the fund  industry. Voucher  funds  make  up an
industry  just like any other  industry  providing  services  to consumers.  Such  a restriction  would
ensure  that no single  fund  obtains  a monopoly  in this industry  and that at least ten funds  must
exist  One  problem  with such  a regulation,  however,  is its enforcement For example,  how
does  one fund  know  the total  value  of shares  held  by all other  funds. What  happens  if  a fund
is very popular  among  voucher  holders  and thus  the fund  violates  this regulation  -because  it is
given too many vouchers? Should  the fimd stop accepting  vouchers  and tun  away new
members?
Require Greater Disdosure
7.8  Perhaps  the most widdy used regulatory  option  is to require  funds (as well as other
corporations)  to disclose  information  about their operations. The objective  is to give fund
shareholders  adequate  information  so that  they can  judge the  performance  of the fund  manage-
meat  If current  shareholders  are dissatisfied  with the performance,  they can elect  a different
Board  of Supervisors  or Management  Board  at the next  annual  meeting  of solders  that in
tun  can select a  new management  company.  This presumes, however, that the current
management  is not able to control or manipulate  the voting at the annual meeting  and that the
widdly dispersed shareholdes take enough interest in the operation of the fund to vote at the
annual meeting.  If adequate  information  is disclosed,  potential  new shaholders  that are
hnkidng  of investing  in a pardcular  fund can  also evaluate  and compare  past performance  and
mivestment  strtge  of one fund  against  another.
7.9  This type of liberal or  "light  handed"  regulation  is probably  the least contrversi
because  it does not  limit  or control  the management  and investment  strategy  of the fund  as long
as the shareholders  approve  of that strategy. The philosophy  s  that fands can adopt any
strategy  as long as they fully and honestly  disclose  this to their shareholders. The cost of
compliance  with this type of regulation  is not large being merely  the cost of gatherig and
pblishing the required  information  about  the  fund's operations.  Govemment  regulators  do not
impose  their own  judgement  about  how  funds  should  be managed  and let fund  shareholders  and
market  forces  deenine  successful  strategies.  14
7.10  Disclosure  regulahons  can  go at least  part way  to controlling  three  out of the four  types
of undesirable  behavior  on the part of funds  (see  Table  3). Disclosure  by itself  is not adequate
"4Even  this type of regulation  has been criticized,  however, as imposing  unnecesary costs on companies
and  fimds  and beneffitng special  interest  groups (brokers  and  dealers)  at the expense  of the shareholders.
Se  Phillips and Zecher (1981).34.  R. Anderson
to contol  monopolizn  by funds.  In this case, shareholdes  of a fund have no incentive to
stop  fund  managers  from engaging  in tds ype  of behavior  since  it increases  profits for the  fund
and the  shareholders  rather  than reducing  them.  The government  must  intvene  to control his
type of behavior  as discussed  above  in para 7.3.
7.11  Regulations  can require the disclosure of a  variety of information  about a fund's
activities. Disclosure  of past financial  results in tie form of balance sheets, profit and loss
statements,  change  in portfolio  of shares held, and so forth can give  eholders  infonation
about the funds operations,  discourage  shirking  by fund managers,  and create inctives  for
better peformance. Requirements  to provide financial statements audited by  approved
accounting  companies  can also help to discover  fraud  or self dealing.
7.12  Disclosure  of any ownership  connections,  commercial  agreements,  or business  deaings
between  the management  company,  the  sponsor, the  fimd  itself, and entepises  owned  by the
fund  reveals  potential  conflicts  of interest that can  lead to self dealing  or even fraud. If such
conflicts  of interest  are a serious  problem  then the  shareholders  can change  the fund manage-
ment at the next annual  meeting.
7.13  In parficular,  a fund could  be required  to disclose  the  prices  paid for shars or receved
from  the sale of shares.  This would  help to eliminate  the possibility  that  a fund was selling  its
shares  for an excessively  low price or buying  shares at a high  - since  these prices could
then be compared  with other prices paid for the same shares at the same tme.  In geneal it
would  not be necessary  to disclose  the  other party to the sale  unless that  party  was affiliatd in
some  way  with the management  company  or the  founder  of the fund. Such  transadons  should
be given special  scrutiny to guard against  self dealing.
7.14  Disclosure  of a fund's investnent  strategy  can  limit high  risk investments  not acceptable
to the fund's shareholdes.  For example,  the fund should dsclose  whether it will have a
diversified  portfolio  or invest  in only a few industries  or enterprises,  the  extent  of borrowing  by
the fund (eveage),  and the  type of securites to be purchased  (for example, common  stock,
shares of other fimds  resulting in pyramids  of owneshiip, debt instruments,  shares listed on
recognized  stock exchanges  or unlisted  shares, real estate, foreign or domestic  securities).
There is noting inherently  wrong wth a fund engagig  in a high-risk  investmnt stategy as
long as the shareholders  are fully informed  and approve  of te  strategy.
Increase Rights of Fund Owners
7.15  The third  type of regulation  includes  those that  regulate  the intenal governance  of the
fund, in other words, how sha  exercise their ownership rights over the fund's
managers.  If the sharolders  have weak control  over the fund managers,  the  managers  may
be prone to shirling, self dealing,  and high risk investments. Strong  oversight  and control  by
shareholders  of the fund will improve  performance  by fimd managers  and in trn  improve
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7.16  An important  issue  in thi  regard is the legal form of the voucher fimd since  is
detrmine  the rights  of the fimd's owners.  Though details and terminology  vuy from country
to country,  an inwestment  fund  can be estabhed in two  basic ways  - as a corporation  or as  a
unit trust. For eample in the Czech  Republic,  voucher  funds initaWly  could  only be created  as
a corporation  but later could be crated as unit uts.  It is not always easy  to decide  which of
these basic legal fom  are being refeed  to especially  in tunslaon since the tems  used to
descrtibe  these  various  types of funds are not Odardized.  This paper will use  th  term
investment  company  for funds that are establislard  as corporatons  and unit trust for finds
establshed  as  f. 5 s  Much of the analysis in this paper assumes that  a voucher fund is
established  as an investment  oDmpany.
7.17  The  basic difference  between  these two legal  forms is that a unit us  is not a separate
legal penon  as is an investment company.  A unit trust has a legal stuctur  based on a contract
typically between a managemet  company, a depository or  tustee,  and the partcipants  or
investors.  The partcpants  in a unit tmst receive  paicipaion  units" instead of shares and
typically  have a right to receive a pro raa share of all the trust's assets and income. The
owners  of paicipaton  units usually  have very  limited  rights  or ability  to control  the activies
of the trustee  or the managemet oompany.  Thus, the unit tust  form of ogani  seems  to
result in a poor system of corporate  governace  of the funds.
7.18  A second issue in establishing the basic structure of a voucher fimd is wher  it is
open  ended" or "closed  ended."  In principlt, both types of funds (investment company  or a
unit trust) can be set up as open ended or closed ended.  The difference betwe  ese two
concepts  is that an  open-end  fund must age  to  redeem  ares or participation  units for cash if
equested  by the fund  paricipants.  In effect,  priipants  can sell thei  shares  or units bacc to
the  fund. The  shares  or units  are redeemed  for the "net  asset value"  of the  fund ftat is the total
market  value  of the  fund's  asst divided  by ffie  number  of shares  or units  of the  fund  outstand-
ing.  Naturally,  if many  holds  demand  redemption,  the fund must sell some  of its
portfolio  of  enterpise  shares to  raise  the  necessary cash.  In  contrast,  shareholders  in a
"closed-end"  investment  company  or holders of par  on  its in a "closed-f;nd  'unit tust
can only sell their shares or participaton units  to other inveson.  If the fund is pemning
badly,  the  pric  for these  shares  or units  may  be  below  their  net  asset  value.
7.19  The  advantage  of open-end  funds  from  the  point  of view  of promodng  good  corpoat
govemance  is that  a poorly  managed  fund  may  simply  wither  away  as  its hahders  demand
that  their  shares  be redemed  for cas.  This  would  put substantial  pressum  on f-nd mmagers
to imprve the  performance  of the  fund. In  a closed-end  fund,  however,  the  shareholers  can
only sel their  sha  to another  investor  if the  fund  is performing  badly,  the  fund  itself  is not
L'Te  teminology  for these  various  types  of funds is made more confusing  by the  similar  teminology
used for the  companies  that are hired to manage  the  fiuns.  In the Czech  and Slovak  Reublics,  for
example,  such management  compaies  are also  referred  to as  investment  companies. 38  Rt.  Anderson
reduced  in size, and the fuInd  managers  may continue  to manage  a large fund  paying  themselves
substantial  fees in spite  of their  poor performance.
7.20  Fund participants  have the greatest  Table 4
rights and can put the mnost  pressure on
managmentto  perform  if the  voucher fund  owners,'  flights  Under  Various  Forms  of
is established  as an open-end  corporation  (se  Voucher  Fund Organization
-~~~  -
Table 4).  In this case, fund owners have two  pen End  Closed End
ways  of exercising  their  rights  as owners  and  __I
thus creating Prsi sure On fund managers: (i)  Corporation  High  Medium
vote for a new Board of Supervisors  or Mant  Unit Tru  kdium  Low
agement Board  at the next annual meting  _ 
who wll  change the  management  company or
(i)  reeem  shares  for cash and force the fund to beome  smalher.  In a closed-nd  corportion,
the shareholders  have only the first way of exercising  their rights, i.e., elect a new  Board of
Supervisors  or Management  Board.  In an open-nd  unt  trust,  the unit holders  have only the
second  way  of  exercising  their  rights,  i.e.,  demand  redemption  of  their  participation  units.
Even worse in a closed-end  unit trust, the fund participants  have almost  no way of putting
pressure  on th  fund managers.
7.21  Though  open-end funds improve  fund goverance,  they have one disadvantage  at least
in the early period of transition in  the  economies.  Such funds may be forced to sell large
amounts of shares on the secondary markets if fund shareholders demand redemption.  Since
secondary  markets  in these countries  are initially  poorly developed  and illquid, funds may
simply not be able to sell their entrprise  shares or such large-scale sellig  of shares could cau
a collapse of these markets. 16
7.22  It is a troubling development  in the Czech  Republic that somate  funds in the sond  wave
of voucher privatization are settig  themselves up as closed-end unit tmsts and a large nuiber
21  argument  advanced  against open-ended  hinds by some  und managers  is that too many fund
shareholders will make the wrong deciion  aboutwhen to redeem their shares and thus hurt the over
performan  of open-ended  funds.  These managers  argue  that unsophisticated  investm wfill  sh to
redem their shares  in the funds  when stock  market  prices  are at a cyclical  low level and, convmdsy,
ush to buy new shares  from the fnids when  stock  market  prices are at a cyclical  high  level. In other
words,  small  investors  systematicaly  make  the wrong  decisions  about  when  to ene  and  leave  the stock
market. This in tu  forces  an open-ended  fund  to buy  shares  when  prices  are high  and sell shares  when
prices are low - an investment  stat  exactly  the opposite  of what is desirable.  tois argument  is
similar  to the "odd  lot" theory  of stock  market  wading  in the United  States. This theory  says  that when
small  investors  are seling shares  (small  blocks  of shares  are called  "odd  lots"), the  smart  u  sophisticated
investor knows that this  is a good time to buy because such 'bod  lot" traders are usually wrong.
Similarly  when  the odd  lot trader is buying  shares,  this is a sign  that the market  is overvalued,  and the
sophisticated  buyers  then  sell their shares.Voucher Funds in the Transition Economies  37
Table S
of  vouher  holders have tranfed  their  .
vouchers  to this type of fund (see Table 5).  Legal  Form  of Czech  Voucher Funds
This organizatonal foo.m  gives the paTUci-  in the Second Wave
pnts  in`the  fund the las  control  over mana  Points*
agement  Thus one reguatory option  is to  Legal  Form  Number  (million)
requr  tat  funds be established  as open-end  -
corportions to maimiz  the ability of the  Corporation
fimd  paricipants to influence  and control  the  - Closed  End  195  1,570
managers  of the fund.  Given t  concern  Unit  Trust
e_sed  above that open-end  funds could  -Closed  End  121  1,480
cause  instabiity in the new secondary  mar-
ke1t for shares, a copronise  might be to  Unit  Trust
require that funds establish themselves  as  - Open End  37  670
closed-end  coraios  initially  but become  Total  353  3,920
open ended after an intial trAnstion  period,
say hee  years.  'Voucher points transferred  by Czech
ditizens  to this type of fund.
7.23  In the analysis  that follows,  it will be
assumed  tht  the voucher  fiud is established
as a corpoation raer  than a unit tust.  General  corporate  law will probably  specify  certain
sbareholder  rights that apply to all cororatons  including  voucher  funds.  These  include:
*  votes per share, in other words, whether  some  class  of shares may be non-voting  or
have more than one vote;
3  number of shareholders  that need tobe  preset  for a quorum to exst  at the annual
eetng of shareholder  (for ecample,  30 percent of all shaReholdes);
*  percentage  of shareholders  resented  at the annual meeting that need to apprve
election  of governance  boards  (typically  a simple  majority);  to apre  genl  resolu-
tions (typically  a simple  majority),  and to arove  undamnal  cnges  in the conp-
any's articles  of association  (typically  66 to 75 percent);
*  whether  cumulative  voting is possible,  ie.,  can shreholders allocate  their votes to a
single  member  of a goavernance  board or must they vote for a complete  satfe  of mem-
bers; and
*  prvisions for soliciting  and  voting  proxies  of those  shareholders  who cannot  attend  the
annual  meeting.
7.24  If a voucher  find is establish  as a corporatio, an issue is who will be allowed  to sit
on the govemance  boards  of the fund to represent  the many shareholders. Because  ownership
of a large fund is dispersed  among  thousands  of shareholder  is the risk that the manage-38  R.  Anderson
meat company  will decide  who sits on the govremance  boards  and that these  boards will not
adequatey supevise the mnagement company. It seems desrable chat  the members  of the
Supervisory  Board should  be idependent of the sponsor,  the management  company,  or any
related or affiliated  company. Thus, one reguatory opfion  is not to allow any employee  or
shareolder o£f  the sponsor, the management  company,  or any affiliated  company  to sit on the
Sup  y  Board.
7.25  The membership  of the Management  Board raises another issue.  The Management
Board  is  pected to canry  out the  anagementof  tbe company. In the case of voucher  funds,
however,  te  ma  t  iS  tpay  carried  out by a management  company  under conct  to
the fund.  In this case, a Management  Board may be largely superfluous and unnecessry.  In
any event, there does not seem to be any reason  not to allow employees  of the mement
comny  to sit on this board since they are the individuals actally  managing the company.
7.26  Specia shareholders'  rights have been  proposed  for voucher  funds that would not be
applicable  to corporations  in general. These  include:
- shareholders  at their annual  meeting  must approve  ffie  ament  of the management
company  and the terms of the contract  with the company;  and
*  shareholdes must  also  approve  any basic  changes  in the  investment  stategy of the fund.
7.7  Liel reguLion  that require greater  disclosure,  regulatiorns  that increase  the rights of
fund owners  are relatively  non-controveial in the sense  that such regulations  are genrally
rcognized as necesary to imrove governance  of companies  including  voucher  funds. Experts
may  disagree,  however,  on what ipecific  regulations  will  best  promote  effecfive  governance  by
shareholder.  For example,  is cumulaive  votng better than non-cumulaive  voting or what
proportin of shareholders  should  be required  for a quorum?
Control  Fund  Operations
7.28  A fourth  tpe  of regulation  indudes those  that  control  and limit  the acal  operations  and
activities  of the funds.  These  are more controversial han the previous  types of regulatons
because thiy impose  the government's  judgement  about the proper mle of funds and may
oveide  the preferences  of the owners of the funds.  In contrast, regulations  that require
imato  disloue  and increase  shareholder  rights  ar  desgned to allow  the shareholders  to
make  better  decisons about  the functioning  of the fumds  and to control  and direct  the managers
of the funds so that they promote  the interest  of the shareholders. Such  regulations,  however,
gill lave  the basic  decisons about the role of the fimds  to their owners.
7.29  The followig are examples  of possible  govenment regulations  intended  to control  and
limit the opations  and actvities of the funds. To control  the risk of fraud or theft from the
fund, sweval oimties  require that funds deposit  their assets such as shares or cash with-:Voucher Funds  in the Transition  Economies  39
licensed  depository  institutions  that can control  any saLL3  or transfer  of these  assets. A
regulation  in the  Czech  and Slovak  Republics  is that  the  sponsors  of a fund  must  contribute  a
certain  minimum  star up capital  for the fund to assure  that  it has  the  resource  to carry  out its
functions  until income  is earned  from its investmnent  portfolio. The required capital, however,
is  not large  - only  one mllion  crowns  or  about  $30,000.
7.30  To discourage  shirking  by managers  and create incentives  for better fund  promne
reglatonsmight  specify  the tems  of the,mngmn  contmct  between  the fund andmage
ment company  - for example,  the requirement  in the Czech and Slovak  countries  tha annual
fees paid to maaeetcompanies  may not exceed two percent of the funds asst  and the
reqirmen i  Russia tha  such fees may not exceed five percent.  These regulations are
designed  toplac  an outer limit on fees -ai  to maaeetcompanies  and to avoid situations
in which the management  companies  have taken effective  control of the funds away from the
fund's shareholders and are paying themselves excessive fees at the expense of  the fund
7.31  More questionable, however, are government regulations that specify the detailed
structur  of fees or other  terms of the management  contract  between  the fund and the  manage-,
ment company. One  proposal  in Slovenia  is that part of the fees paid toDaagmn  companies
should  consis of shares  in the fund, and the maaeetcompany  may not sell the shares  for
a fixed number of years.  Similarly in Poland, the proposal is to compensate  mngmn
companies  by a mix of cash and shares in the fund. These proposals  are designed  to give the
managemient  company  greater incentives  to increase the value of the fund's assets because  thie
managmentcompany  itself holds  a lairge  number  of fund shares. It has also been  proposed  that
a goyverment regulatory agency approve all mngmn  contracts.  In  these ca3se, the
government  iuiz decided  that iLt  knows the best terms of the mngetcontract  and tha1t  the
owners of the funds  cannot decide on the best temns or cannot impose these terms on  fth
managmentcompany.  Detailed  government  regulations  may be harmful because  the governi-
ment may not know the best terms of a management  contract, and such regulatons limit the
ability of funds to experiment  or try other forms of a management  contract.
7.32  To reduce self dealing and conflicts of interest when a fund buys or sells shares, the
Czech and Slovak  Republics  require tha  the priLce  paid for shares must be no higher tha  the
current "market  price" and the price received for share  must be no lower tha  the current
"market  price."  It is not easy to enforce such a regulation  because  of th-e  difficudty  in defining
what is the current market  price. This is particularly  true in the emerging  stock markets  in the
transtion countrie.  In  such markets, shares may be traded only infrequently  or in small
volumes  on the public stock  exchange. The prices for small  trades may not be applicable  to the
large trades  that a fund is likely  to make, for example,  when  a fund sells a large block  of shares
directly to another fund without  going through  an exchange.
7.33  Also to reduce self dealig  and conflicts of interest, it has been proposed that the
governmet  Dshould  stricy  reguate  both who can own  E  companies  and all commer-40  R. Anderson
cial  raeet  between  the  sponsors,  the  maaeetcompanies,  the  funds,  and  the
enterprises  owned  by the fuinds. For example,  it has been  proposed  thiat  banks  not be allowed
to sponsor  fuinds  or be the owners  of management  companies  because  of the conflict  of interest
that  some see between  being a lender to an enterprise and representing  the owners of the
entrprse.In response,  banks have proposed  'Chinese walls" that would stop any flow of
infrmaionbetween  the lending  operations  of a bank  and the management  companies  owned  by
the batk  This dual role of banks, however,  is quite  common  in Germany  and Japan where
banks  are both  leaders  and owners  of enterprises  and does  not appear  to have  caused  significant
concern  about  conflicts  of interest  and self dealing  in those  countries.
7.34  Also  prohibiting  banks  from sponsoring  funds or owning  maaeetcompanie  may
mean  that funds and maaeetcompanies  may be-  operated  by less qualfied individuals  or
orgaizaion. Transition  economics  do not have  large numbers  of people  with the necessary
trAining  and experience  to manage  funds.  Banks and their employees  may have more of the
necessary  training  and experience  than almost  anyone  else.
7.35  In the Czech and Slovak  Republics, funds may not own share  in its mngmn
company  or in the owners  of the maaeetcompany  (for example,  a bank tha founded  the
managmentcompany  and the fund). The concern  here is that the fund's ownership  of share
in the bank that sponsored  the fund may allow the bank managers  to Jargely control the
ownership  of the bank and prohibiLt  any other investor  from gainig  control  over the bankr A
related concern  might  be that the fund will be used to nmanpulate  the price of shares in the
bank.
7.36  For similar  reasons,  others  have  proposed  that  a mngmn  company  or its owners  (for
example, a bank that founded  the fund) shtould  be prhbtdfrom  having any commercial
agreeents  wit  enterprise owned  by the fund. Such  prohibited  commecald getet  would
icuelending  to the enterprises,  consulting  agreements,  and selling  any products  or services
to the enterprises. Such  a comprehensive  provision  seems to effectively  exclude  any exis;ting
entrprseor  business  from establishing  a maaeetcompany  because  that  enterprise  or firm
would  have  to give up any other business  activity. This seems  to have  the effect of requiring
that a fund  be founded  by someone  with no business  or financial  experience. In contrast,  the
assmptonbehind  disclosure  requirements  is that fund  owners  can control  any self dealing  or
conflicts  of interest that may aris  if ownership  connections  and commercil agrements are
required  to be disclosed.
Limit Fund  Investments
7.37  To control  or limit  high  risk investments  by funds,  some  countries  have  imposed  variou
resnctonson  the types  of investments  that a fund  can make. For example  as discussed  above,
the Czech  and Slovak  Republics  requir  that  a fimd  not invest  more  than ten  percent  of its assets
in the share  of any one enterpris.  The objective  is to limit risk:  by requiring  a diversfied
portfolio.  Such a restriction,  in effect, require  a fund to invest in at least ten differenVoucher  Funds  in the  Transition  Economies  41
enterprise.  The  reality in these countries  is tha the Large  and most important  funds  invest  in
maymore  than ten enterprises  though  this rule may be binding  on smaller funds. It has also
been  proposed  in other  countries  that funds not be allowed  to invest  in certain types  of assets
(for example,  real estate, non-listed,  or illiquid  securitie) or to borrow to male investments
because  such  leverae is excessively  risky. Again  such  regulations  assume  that fth  fund  owners
cannot  choose  an appropriate  investment  strategy  or cannot  control  the fund managers.
7.38  Most Western countries and some  Table 6
transition countries  impose controls on the
proportion of  shares in a single enterprise  Restrictions  on Fund  Ownership  of Shares
that may be owned  by a fund (or group of  in a Single  Company
related funds). For examples,  see Table 6.  1maximum
Though  this type  of regulation  is widespread,ConrOwesi
it is difficult  to find an explanation  of why itConrOwesi
is Deeded.  Czech  Republic  20%
7.39  The fact that this type of regulation  is  Soain0
common  m Western countries  is sometimes  Russia  10%
used  as an argument  why a similar  regulation  Lihaa  0
is  needed in transition economies.  This,  Lihaa50
however,  may lead to the result that a poor  United  States  5%
or harmful  regulation  in Western  countries  is
simpy  trnsferedto  tnnsition economies  France  10%
withctiut  analysis  of why  it is needed  or POssi-  Germany  10%
bit adverse consequences. In other words,  OC  eomnain  5
transition  countries  should  not blindy make  OClecmedtin  -5
the same mistakes  as Western countries  in
their regulation  of funds.
7.40  There  is often  a lack  of clear goverment statements  as to why  these  limitations  on fund
ownership  were adopted  in Western  countries,  but same reasons  might  be that:
*  funds  in some counties are set up as trusts  rather tha  corporations,  have  only limited
legal rights, and are not considered  appropriate  legal  entitis to own and control  compa-
nies;
*  in the United States,  funds can technically  own more  tha  five percent  of the shares  of
a company  but are inhibited  from doing so by regulatory  and tax restrictions; 17
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*  in many  Westen countries,  there is widespread  suspicion  of what appea  to be large
concentrations  of  cconom;c  power in funds and a desire  to control  that power in some
way. For example,  demanls for stricter  reguation of investment  funds  by the Federal
Government  of the United  States  began  in the 1930's when  concerns  about concentra-
tions of econr,mic  power were at their height due to the Great Depression;
*  in the European  Economic  Community,  there may be concern  that  a fund  established  in
one country  could  control  enterpnses  in anotier country;  and
*  managers  of enterpris  may  fear  control  by lage institutional  investors  and thus  support
limitations  on ownership  by funds.
7.41  Such regulations  can senously  impair the ability  of funds to play a role in corporate
goverance and thus  reduce  the benefits  from  voucher  prvation.  If a fund  cannot  own  more
than 10 percent  of the shares  of an enterprise,  the government  is implicitly  adopting  the first
model of corporate  govence  described  above, namely,  dispersed  ownship  with no large
owner exercising  control  over an enteprise.  If a fund cannot  own more than  50 pect  of the
shares of a single  company,  te  the third model  of corporate  govremance  based  on a holdmg
company  structure  cannot  be implemented.  If a fund can own somewhere  between  10 and 50
perent of the shares  in a sing  enterprise,  then the second  model  of corporate  govemance  is
still feasible,  namely,  institutional  ownership.  As discussed  above  in the case of the Czech  and
Slovak  Republics  where a fund can own up to 20 percent of the shares of an enprise,  the
limited  initial  information  seems  to suggest  that this model  of corpoate governance  is working
reasonably  well.  Thus, limits on fund ownership  of about  20 percent  do not seem to greatly
impair  the ability  of funds to govern  enteprises.
7.42  Thus it would  appear  that counties such  as the Czech  Republic,  Slovaka, and Russia
are adopting  the institutional  ownership  model  but in effect prohibiting  the holding  company
model.  There may be one valid argument  for effectively  prohibiting  the holding  company
modd because  of the weak  legal system  in these  countres and inability  of rglatory  authonties
and the courts to protect the rights of minoty  saeholders.  In the institutional  ownership
model,  all owners  are minority  owners,  and a coalition  of such owners  is necessy  to control
the enterprise.  In the holding company model, however, a sie  majority owner can largely
cotrol  the enterprise  in spite  of the wishes  of minority  shareholders. In this case there would
seem to be more potenial for confficts  of interest  and self dealing. The majority  shareholder
could influence and control  the enterprise  for its own benefit  even though the intersts  of the
minoxity shareholdes  would be harmed.
7.43  One example of self dealing by a majority shareholder  was given by a fund manager in
the  Czech Republic.  In this  case,  however,  the majority  owner  of a  Czech  company  was a
foreig  company, and the fund was a minority owner.  The majority owner was requiring the
enterprse managers  to sell  products  to the majority  owner  for distribution  in a foreign  country.
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unfirly  reducing the profits of the Czech company  and the dividends  paid to the  minonity
owners. If this  allegation  is true, the  majority  owner was controlling  the  Czech  company  for
its own benefit  rather  than the benefit  of all shareholders,  in other words, a dear  case of self
dealing.
7.44  Ihus, it may  be desimble  to Limit  funds to being  miority but sfill  large shareholders  of
enterpises.  The fimds  as large minorqty  ehlders  would still have an incentive  to devote
resources to monitoring  the perfomce  of the enterprises, to assign staff to be on the
govenance boards, and to intervene  in coopraon  with other owners if it appe  that the
enterprise  is mismanaged. To effectively  control  the enterprise,  however,  a fimd  would  have
to  join a coalition  with other  funds. This would  guarantee  that the  enterprise  could not  be used
to promote  the interests  of just one shareholder  at the expense  of other shareholders. Such a
coalition  of large shareholders  would still be able to effectively  govern  the enterprise  and thus
not sacdfice  the increases  in efficiency  and profitable  that is the  objective  of privatization.
7.45  Such a limitation  on ownership  by funds, however,  effectively  rules out the  holding
company  model  of corpate  govemance. It must be noted  that  this  concem  about  conflicts  of
interest and self dealing  would also arise when  an owner of an enterprise  other than  a fund
owns more than a  majority of  are  but  lss  th  100 pect  ownership.  f  funds are
prolhibited  from  becoming  majoty  shareholders,  then this should  apply  equally  to other types
of owners as well.  There  is no clear reason  why funds should  be singled  out for this type  of
restriction.
8.  Recommendations
8.1  The transition  economies  where  privatly-sponsored  funds have  arisen must develop  a
fexible and evolving  regulatory  regime  for these  new  institutions. Because  these  funds  play a
different role from imilar funds in Westem countries, models  of regulion  used in those
countries  are probably not applicable  without modification. In contrast to some Western
countries, funds in transition economies  should be encouraged  to play a positive role in
corporate  governance  and thus help to overcome  a major  weakness  in these  countries,  namely,
a lack of good pivate owners for enterprises.  Regulation f these new funds should be
expermental  and change  over time  when arious  prcblems  arise  in the opeation  and manage-
ment of the new fimds.
8.2  One  regulatoxy  stregy  is for the  goverments in these  countries  to refrain  from initially
sng any specil regulatory  rerments  on funds other than those  that would  apply  to all
corporations  including  competition  laws. Prsumably corporate  law in these  counties already
requires corporations  to disclose  infomation about  their operations  and specifies  the nghts of
shareholders  in controlling  the managers.  If special  problems  arise  in the opeation  of the  funds
in the  future,  the goverment could  then add  additional  reguations  specfically  designed  to meet
those  problems.44  R. Anderson
8.3  A second  strategy  would  be to try to anticipate  all of the possible  problems  that might
arise with  the funds  and put in place  now a lengthy  and cozaplex  set of reguladons  designed  to
deal with those problems. Such a regulatory  framework  would go beyond  simply requiring
funds to disclose  information  about their operatons and specifying  the rights of shareholders
and would impose quantitative  controls on the operation  of funds and on fund investments.
These nmght  iaclude  limits on the proportion  of shares that a fund can own in a company,
required  provisions  in management  contracts  including  the fee structure,  prohibitions  on certain
individuals  and  entrprises founding  funds  or owning  management  companies,  limits  on business
relationships  between  the funds  and other  parties,  limits  on high  risk investments,  and so forth.
8.4  There  are several  difficulties  with the second  strategy. It assumes  that shareholders  will
not effectively  control  the funds  because  of weak  shareholder  rights  or because  fund managers
will not provide  adequate  informadon  about  their operations. It also assumes  that the govem-
ment can predict the impact of these detailed  regulations. The risk in imposing detailed
quantittive regulations  is that they may distort  incentives  and have  unintended  and undesirable
consequnces.  For example,  a complex  fee structure  may induce  management  companies  to
adopt an undesrable investment  strategy  that no one could foresee  when the structe  was
adopted. Another  example  is that  prohibitions  against  certain  individuals  or institutions  owning
management  companies  may  result  in such  companies  being  run by poorly  qualified  individuals.
Also such  detiled regulabons  may not allow the operation  and structure of funds  to evolve  as
market  conditions  change.
8.5  On balance,  the best  strategy  at least initially  is to subject  the funds  only to the normal
requirements  of corporate  and competiton  law that apply  to all corporations  but with  just a few
dditonal regulations  to deal with special  problems  of voucher  finds that can now be cleady
identified. These additional  regulations  would  primarily  require the funds either to disclose
additional  information  or give shareholders  greater rights in the management  of the funds.
Detailed  regulations  that control  fund  operations  or restrict  investment  decisions  do not appear
to be needed  at present  though  such  regulations  could  be introduced  in the future  if problems
arise in the operations  of the funds.
8.6  The recommended  special  regulations  for funds  not applicable  to other corporations  are
*  a fund should  be established  as a corporation  rather than a unit trust;
*  members of  the Supervisory  Board may not be employees  or  shareholders  of the
management  company,  the owners  of the management  company  (for example,  a bank
that sponsored  a fund), or any affiliated  company;
*  a lmit should  be placed  on the total annual  fees that a fund may pay to a manament
company. Such  a limit  should  be designed  to stop  clearly  excessive  fee payments. ForVoucher Funds in the Transition Economies  45
example  in the Czech and Slovak Republics,  total annual fees paid to a management
company  cannot  exceed  two percent of the fimd's asset value.
*  funds should submit their selection  of a management  company  and the management
contact for approval  at each annual  meeting  of the shareholders;
*  finds should  also submit their investnent strategy  for approval  at the annual  meeting;
*  funds should  disclose  any ownership  connections  or commercial  relationships  between
the management  company,  its owners, the fund, and all of fte enterprises  in the fimd's
portfolio;
*  funds should  disclose  the prices they  p-d  for or received  from the sale of shares in their
porfolios including  the date the transaction  was made;
*  fond should  disclose the other party to any purchase or sale of shares as well as the
prce  if  the oher party is affiliated  in any way with the management  company, the
sponsor  of the fund, or major shareholders  of the fimd or if the other party is another
fund also being managed  by the same management  company;  and
*  funds should  be required to place their shares and other assets in the custody of an
approved  depository  institution  to avoid  possible theft and fraud.
8.7  As discussed  above, an argument  can be made that funds should  also be limited to
owning nomore than 20 or 30 percent of the shares of an enterprise to avoid conflicts of
interest and self dealing  that might  arise if funds were allowed  to be majority  shareholders  of
a company. In effect, this restriction  would requie  a fund to share control of an enteprise
with other funds.  Such a restiction would, however, effectively  rule out the third model of
cporate  govemance  based on a holding  company. Our knowledge  of the various models  of
corporate  governance  is not sufficient  to say that any one model  is clearly superior  to another.
If it appers  that serious  conflicts  of interest  or self dealing  arises when  a fund owns  a majority
shareholding  in a company  then limiting  a fund's shareholding  is an option  for the fuue.  In
any event, if such  a  restiction  is applied  to funds, it shouldalso be applied to any other owner
of shares  in a company.
8.8  Also a strong argument can be made that funds should eventually  be required to be
open-end  funds in which solders  can demand  that the funds  redeem their shares for cash.
This would  place  substantal pressure on fund  managers  to improve  performance  or else see the
fund and thus their management  fees decline  in sie.  This requrment,  however, should  only
be intoduced after the secondary  market for shares has developed  and matured  and thus large
sing  of shares  by fumds  would not unnecessarily  disrupt the markeL46  R. Anderson
*  ~~8.9  Since  the fends in the Czech  and Slovak  Republics  have  been owners  of enterprises  for
no more tha  one year, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions  about the role of these funds.
Also, this report is based on a limited  number  of interviews  with government  officials,  funds,
and enterprises. The experience  to date, however,  does suggest  that the funds  are beginning  to
play a useful role in corporat governance  which  is potentially  their greatest  contribution  to the
sucessul  eform of the transition  economies  in Central and Eastern Europe.  No concrete
evidence of serious problems wiLth  fund management  has yet arisen.  Since the role and
functions  of these  funds are evolving  and experience  with this type of fund in Western  countries
is lmimited,  it is difficult to specify the best regulatory  framework  for these funds.  In these
circmstnce,  the best regulatory strategy  is to adopt initialy a relatively light handed or
hlbera approach  to regulation  tha allows  the funds to evolve  and change. Only when  serious
problems  or weaknesses  arise in the performance  and behavior  of funds should  the government
impose additional  regulations  designed  to deal with those specific  problems.Voucher Funds in the Transition Economies  47
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